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I. INTRODUCTION
Shindano is a sixty-year-old woman who lives on the island of Zanzibar, a semiautonomous region of Tanzania.1 She has been residing in the small village of
Mkokotoni, where she has had to survive without support from her husband, Abu, for the
last five months. After five years of marriage, Abu ordered Shindano out of his home,
telling her to “leave [his] house and go back to be with [her] fellow dogs, slatterns, and
lunatics.” While Abu initially supported her for a few months, he has not helped her
financially for some time. Shindano now seeks to dissolve her marriage to Abu in the
local kadhi’s court, claiming that Abu’s statements and actions constitute a divorce under
Islamic law. The court denies Shindano’s request because Abu never uttered or wrote the
appropriate Islamic divorce formula. She is ordered to return to her husband and treat
him well; the court orders Abu to support his wife and respect her.
This story is an example of a typical divorce proceeding within the kadhi’s court
system of Zanzibar. Had Shindano been a man, however, or a non-Muslim, or a resident
of mainland Tanzania (“Tanganyika”), the result of this proceeding may have been very
different. Courts in Tanganyika and Zanzibar each recognize and enforce the right of
Muslim men to unilaterally divorce their wives under Islamic law. Yet, Tanganyika’s
family law in addition provides for a uniform, secular marriage dissolution process,
which is available to both men and women regardless of religious affiliation. In
Zanzibar, marriages between Muslims are dissolved solely in accordance with principles
of Islamic law, while non-Muslims do not have any official statutes to govern their
divorce proceedings.
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Erin Elizabeth Stiles, A Kadhi and His Court: Marriage, Divorce, and Zanzibar’s Islamic Legal Tradition
288 (Aug. 2002) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Washington University) (on file with John M. Olin
Library, Washington Univ.) [hereinafter Stiles, A Kadhi and His Court].
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The United Republic of Tanzania (“the Republic”), a political union of two semiautonomous entities, the mainland area of Tanganyika and the islands of Zanzibar,2 is a
nation composed of multiple ethnic, religious, and tribal groups. Like most of its African
neighbors, Tanzania underwent a period of colonization, during which a series of
European nations ruled over both Tanganyika and Zanzibar. These colonizers established
a dual system of law – one legal system for the European population and another for the
indigenous inhabitants. Following independence, Tanzania and its neighbors on the
continent sought to shed this discriminatory form of justice and establish a system that
represented and respected the culture of its people. Because the borders drawn by
European colonial powers were virtually arbitrary in nature, many of the newlyindependent states that succeeded those former colonies also inherited the same political
boundaries. As a result, countries such as Tanzania are populated by a heterogeneous
citizenry, the members of which belong to any number of ethnic, racial, religious, and
tribal communities.
This article examines the problems that arise when multicultural societies adopt a
pluralist system of justice in order to preserve the traditions of its diverse communities,
using Tanzania as a case study. The authors illustrate that despite Tanzania’s
considerable efforts in balancing individual and group rights, its political leaders have
replaced the nation’s colonial legal system with one that is still fragmented and
discriminatory. In order to accommodate its various religious and ethnic groups,
Tanzania established a pluralistic legal system that while laudable in its objectives, denies
some of its citizens the basic equal protection guarantees provided in the Tanzanian
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Kenneth McK. Norrie, Administration of Justice in Tanzania and Zanzibar: A Comparison of Two
Judicial Systems in One Country, 38 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 395 (1989).
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Constitution and under international law. This problem is especially symptomatic in
family law, a sensitive area that implicates the most sacrosanct of personal relations and
delineates the outermost boundaries of community membership. As evidenced by the
laws of marriage and divorce currently in force, Tanzania affords its citizens radically
different rights based on their gender, religion, and place of origin. While Tanzanian
matrimonial law represents a relatively narrow field of academic inquiry, the lessons
drawn from an investigation into this legal and cultural milieu can be illuminating when
placed within the context of larger issues affecting multicultural societies. The so-called
“paradox of multicultural vulnerability”3 affects not only young, postcolonial nations in
Africa4 and Asia5, but also individuals in cosmopolitan, economically-developed
countries such as Israel,6 the United States,7 and Canada.8
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AYELET SHACHAR, MULTICULTURAL JURISDICTIONS: CULTURAL DIFFERENCES AND WOMEN’S RIGHTS 3
(2001) [hereinafter SHACHAR, MULTICULTURAL JURISDICTIONS].
4
See, e.g., Boaventura de Sousa Santos, The Heterogenous State and Legal Pluralism in Mozambique, 40
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 39 (2006); Aili Mari Tripp, The Politics of Women’s Rights and Cultural Diversity in
Uganda, in GENDER JUSTICE, DEVELOPMENT, AND RIGHTS 427-32 (Maxine Molyneux & Shahrashoub
Razavi, eds., 2002); Anne Hellum, Human Rights and Gender Relations in Postcolonial Africa: Options
and Limits for the Subjects of Legal Pluralism, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 635 (2000); David M. Bigge &
Amelie von Briesen, Note, Conflict in the Zimbabwean Courts: Women’s Rights and Indigenous SelfDetermination in Magaya v. Magaya, 13 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 289 (2000); Anne Griffiths, Reconfiguring
Law: An Ethnographic Perspective from Botswana, 23 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 587 (1998).
5
See, e.g., Pratibha Jain, Balancing Minority Rights and Gender Justice: The Impact of Protecting
Multiculturalism on Women’s Rights in India, 23 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 20 (2005).
6
See id. at 57-60 (discussing the plight of the agunah, a woman who is “anchored” into a marriage under
Jewish law by virtue of her husband’s refusal to grant a divorce).
7
See Brenda Oppermann, The Impact of Legal Pluralism on Women’s Status: An Examination of Marriage
Laws in Egypt, South Africa, and the United States, 17 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 65, 87-90 (2006); Ayelet
Shachar, Group Identity and Women’s Rights in Family Law: The Perils of Multicultural Accommodation,
6 J. POL. PHIL. 285, 285 (1998) [hereinafter Shachar, Group Identity and Women’s Rights] (citing the U.S.
Supreme Court case, Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978), which declined to interfere with
gender-biased qualifications for Native American tribal membership).
8
In 2003, the Canadian Society of Muslims proposed the establishment of Islamic family law arbitral
tribunals in the province of Ontario, a campaign that incited a backlash in the media and in political circles.
See generally James Thornback, The Portrayal of Sharia in Ontario, 10 APPEAL 1 (2005). Many of the
criticisms related to the potential intricacies involved in reconciling competing bodies of secular and
religious law, including “the conflict between the various schools of Islamic law and deciding which one
would apply, the conflict between the civil courts applying religious law or instead a separate religious
court, and the conflict between certain aspects of Muslim family law and various human rights treaties.”
Lawrence Blackstone, Courting Islam: Practical Alternatives to a Muslim Family Court in Ontario, 31
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Part II of this article describes the phenomenon of legal pluralism and the impact
it has on the individual rights of women belonging to communities whose discriminatory
cultural practices have been accommodated by the state.9 Part III narrows in on Tanzania
by offering a brief political history of the nation,10 while Part IV describes the
development of Tanzania’s multifaceted legal system.11 Part V surveys the current law of
marriage and divorce in Tanzania, highlighting the differentiated nature of justice
available to parties in both Tanganyika and Zanzibar.12 Part VI then explores ways to
alleviate the discrimination written into Tanzania’s marriage and divorce laws while
acknowledging the significant obstacles that hinder programs for reform in Tanzania.13
II. LEGAL PLURALISM AND WOMEN’S RIGHTS: AN OVERVIEW
Like many countries that lived through the colonial experience, Tanzania
inherited a “legal stew” of European laws superimposed upon or existing concurrently
with indigenous systems of customary and religious law.14 This phenomenon, which is
known as “legal pluralism,” has given rise to a field of academic inquiry devoted to the
study of how multiple sets of norms, both formal and informal, interact with each other
and affect their subjects.15 For purposes of this article, the investigation will be limited to
the “juristic” view of legal pluralism, which refers to the situation where “the sovereign

BROOKLYN J. INT’L L. 207, 218 (2005). The provincial legislature ultimately responded in February 2006
by banning binding arbitration based on religion in the resolution of family law disputes. Kelly Gillespie,
‘One law for all Ontarians’ in divorce, child custody, TORONTO STAR, Feb. 16, 2006, at A5. For a
historically-grounded analysis of the rhetoric behind the sharia debate in Ontario, see Anver M. Emon,
Islamic Law and the Canadian Mosaic: Politics, Jurisprudence, and Multicultural Accommodation, SING.
J. LEGAL STUD., (forthcoming 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=898924.
9
See Infra, Part II.
10
See Infra, Part III.
11
See Infra, Part IV.
12
See Infra, Part V.
13
See Infra, Part VI.
14
Jennifer L. Rakstad et al., The Progress of Tanzanian Women in the Law: Women in Legal Education,
Legal Employment and Legal Reform, 10 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 35, 92 (2000).
15
Grant R. Woodman, Legal Pluralism and the Search for Justice, 40 J. AFR. L. 152, 157-158 (1996).
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commands different bodies of law for different groups of the population varying by
ethnicity, religion, nationality, or geography, and when the parallel legal regimes are all
dependent on the state legal system.”16
Not surprisingly, the legal pluralist paradigm has been criticized for a number
reasons, chiefly stemming from its reputation as being “unnecessarily complex, as
denying the principle of equality before the law, as underpinning grossly unjust modes of
production or racial discrimination.”17 The argument for applying simpler rules of law
springs from the idea that justice is not easily achieved if its administration is too
complicated.18 Perhaps even more troublesome is the issue of equality before the law.
Tanzania’s pluralist legal system, which is the main focus of this article, is a prime
example of multicultural accommodation, wherein the state “attempts to facilitate groups’
practices and norms, for example, by exempting group members from certain laws, or by

16

Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 LAW & SOC’Y. REV. 869, 871 (1988). Legal pluralism has also
come to describe an anthropologically-oriented study of competing normative systems. This broader
conception, called “deep legal pluralism” by Gordon Woodman, extends the concept of “law” to include
non-state modes of social ordering. Indeed, the juristic view of legal pluralism, or “state law pluralism,”
“has sometimes been said not to be true legal pluralism, or at least not to be a form of legal pluralism which
can be of interest social science.” Woodman, supra note 15, at 158. Gunther Teubner sums up the ethos of
the deep legal pluralist approach thus:
Postmodern jurists love legal pluralism. They do not care about the law of the centralized
State with its universalist aspirations. It is the “asphalt law” of the Brasilian favelas, the
informal counter-rules of the patchwork of minorities, the quasi-laws of dispersed ethnic,
religious, and cultural groups, the disciplinary techniques of “private justice,” the
plurality of non-State laws in associations, formal organizations, and informal networks
where they find the ingredients of postmodernity: the local, the plural, the subversive.
Gunther Teubner, The Two Faces of Janus: Rethinking Legal Pluralism, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 1443, 1443
(1991). See also Dolores A. Donovan & Getachaw Assefa, Homicide in Ethiopia: Human Rights,
Federalism, and Legal Pluralism, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 505, 542 (2005) (distinguishing between formal and
anthropological concepts of legal pluralism).
17
Woodman, supra note 15, at 159.
18
Id. at 161.

6

awarding identity groups some degree of self-governance.”19 As a result, legal pluralism
“provides for different norms to be applied to different persons in the same situation.20
While it has been pointed out that unequal treatment of individuals does not
automatically make a set of laws unjust,21 systems that follow a model of multicultural
accommodation pose a unique problem, which has been identified by Ayelet Shachar as
“the paradox of multicultural vulnerability.”22 In a diverse nation-state, allowing various
religious and cultural groups to manage their own affairs in areas like family law
increases the autonomy that these populations enjoy.23 Indeed, the idea that multicultural
accommodation is antithetical to the principles of liberal democracy has eroded in recent
years.24 Unfortunately, expansion of communal rights can encroach on the individual
rights of particular group members who also fall within “traditionally subordinated

19

Shachar, Group Identity and Women’s Rights, supra note 7, at 286.
Woodman, supra note 15, at 160.
21
Id. at 162 (arguing that no legal system provides for absolute equality under the law).
22
SHACHAR, MULTICULTURAL JURISDICTIONS, supra note 3, at 3; see also Shachar, Group Identity and
Women’s Rights, supra note 7, at 289.
23
Shachar, Group Identity and Women’s Rights, supra note 7, at 289. Family law is an especially crucial
arena where the debate over multicultural accommodation plays out because it “demarcates membership
boundaries in two related ways: first, by developing complex lineage rules which determine who, by virtue
of birth, is eligible for acquiring full membership in the group, and secondly, by defining who by way of
marriage can become a group member.” SHACHAR, MULTICULTURAL JURISDICTIONS, supra note 3, at 5152.
24
See generally, e.g., WILL KYMLICKA, LIBERALISM, COMMUNITY, AND CULTURE (1989); IRIS MARION
YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE (1990); Jürgen Habermas, Address, Multiculturalism
and the Liberal State, 47 STAN. L. REV. 849, 850-51 (1995). Theorists have traditionally asserted that
liberalism’s exaltation of individual autonomy to be in conflict with multiculturalism’s preoccupation with
securing communal rights. There has been greater recognition, however, that social attachments are “one
of the principal ways in which person define themselves,” thus leading to the result that “groupdifferentiated rights are now substantially more likely to be defended as essential to individual well-being.”
Eric J. Mitnick, Individual Vulnerability and Cultural Transformation, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1635, 1636-37,
1640 (2003) (reviewing SHACHAR, MULTICULTURAL JURISDICTIONS, supra note 3]. Additionally,
defenders of multicultural policies have asserted that such measures “help[] to remedy the disadvantages
which minorities suffer within difference-blind institutions,” which in fact may be “implicitly tilted towards
the needs, interests, and identities of the majority group . . . creat[ing] a range of burdens, barriers,
stigmatizations, and exclusions for members of minority groups.” Will Kymlicka, Comments on Shachar
and Spinner-Halev: An Update from the Multiculturalism Wars, in MULTICULTURAL QUESTIONS (Christian
Joppke & Steven Lukes eds., 1999).
20
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classes, such as women.”25 Where group norms provide for discriminatory treatment of
such classes, “the state’s multicultural policies conflate the language of ‘respect to
groups’ with a license to subordinate specific group members.”26
Over the years, scholars and activists, particularly in the area of international
development, have engaged the problem of women’s rights and cultural tradition in the
developing world in a number of ways.27 During the early 1970s, the liberal feminist
movement sought to end the invisibility of women in the economic life of impoverished
nations by decrying “backward and oppressive traditions that constrain women’s
freedom.”28 However, casually denouncing traditional practices as retrograde and
incompatible with the modern concept of human rights glosses over the complex
dynamics of the communities where those rules are applied. As Brenda Oppermann
points out, “in many countries traditional law is often the only form of law known to
many people, particularly those living in nonurban areas.”29 Thus, customary or religious
law may be the chief guarantor of order in communities where the state’s reach is weak.30
In relation to the issue of sexual equality, the one-dimensional portrayal of women as
25

Shachar, Group Identity and Women’s Rights, supra note 7, at 289. Female members of minority groups
may thus be subject to double-subordination as a “minority within a minority.” See generally MINORITIES
WITHIN MINORITIES: EQUALITY, RIGHTS, AND D IVERSITY (Avigail Eisenberg & Jeff Spinner-Halev eds.,
2005) (exploring conflicts between members within minority groups).
26
Id. at 291.
27
See Celestine I. Nyamu, How Should Human Rights and Development Respond to Cultural
Legitimization of Gender Hierarchy in Developing Countries?, 41 HARV. INT’L L.J. 381, 383 (2000).
28
Id. at 384.
29
Oppermann, supra note 7, at 66.
30
Id. at 91; see also Leila Chirayath et al., Customary Law and Policy Reform: Engaging with the Plurality
of Justice Systems 6 (2005) (background paper for the World Development Report 2006: Equality and
Development, World Bank), available at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDR2006/Resources/4773831118673432908/Customary_Law_and_Policy_Reform.pdf (last visited May 13, 2006) (“Even if state
systems do not lack legitimacy, they may be at odds with prevailing systems of conflict mediation within a
particular community and/or be predominantly inaccessible due to geographical and socioeconomic
barriers, or alternatively due to a luck of knowledge or awareness of the system on the part of political
leaders . . . . In many cases state regimes do not have the capacity or legitimacy to fill in the gaps in social
ordering and conflict resolution when local level systems are undermined . . . when neither formal nor
informal mechanisms are functioning, human rights abuses and serious conflict are more likely to occur.”).
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long-suffering victims of pre-modern custom ignores the agency of individuals who live
out each day ably negotiating their roles across the social landscape.31 This binary
opposition between helpless Third World women and their liberated Western
counterparts can thus reinforce colonialist stereotypes,32 with universalist notions of
human rights33 masquerading as “the interrogation of one culture by another culture –
specifically, by the Western liberal culture . . . that is a logical outgrowth of
Christianity.”34
The late 1970s ushered in a more class-conscious view of gender relations that
relied heavily on Marxist ideals.35 This materialist view concerned itself with the broader

31

See Leti Volpp, Feminism Versus Multiculturalism, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1181, 1211 (2001); Hellum,
supra note 4, at 644-46.
32
Nyamu, supra note 27, at 386; see also Adrien Katherine Wing, Polygamy from Southern Africa to Black
Britannia to Black America: Global Critical Race Feminism as Legal Reform for the Twenty-first Century,
11 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 811, 814 (“Some westerners have been seen as trying to impose a western
oriented value system that may reject polygamy and other cultural or religious practices as backward and
sexist”); Cheryl B. Preston, Women in Traditional Religions: Refusing to Let Patriarchy (or Feminism)
Separate Us from the Source of Our Liberation, 22 MISS. C.L. REV. 185, 194 (2003) (“. . . Western
feminists may inadvertently reduce Third World Women to the category of victim.”); Gila Stopler,
Countenancing the Oppression of Women: How Liberals Tolerate Religious and Cultural Practices That
Discriminate Against Women, 12 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 154, 209-10 (2003) (“ . . . the way in which
outsiders to the community assume and accept the existence of discriminatory practices against women in
minority communities is in itself a form of racism since it is based on the feelings of superiority that the
outsiders have toward the community . . . [a] good example . . . is the way in which the imperial powers in
the nineteenth century justified colonization by pointing to women’s inferior status in the subjugated
cultures relative to their status in Europe . . .”).
33
See Sundhya Pahuja, Comparative Visions of Global Public Order (Part I): The Postcoloniality of
International Law, 46 HARV. INT’L L.J. 459, 466-469 (2005) (arguing the so-called “universal” human
rights fail to include indigenous perspectives, thus reinforcing ideals of Western cultural superiority); Sally
Engle Merry, From Law and Colonialism to Law and Globalization, 28 Law & Soc. Inquiry 569, 582-83
(2003) (reviewing MARTIN CHANOCK, LAW, CUSTOM, AND SOCIAL ORDER: THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE IN
MALAWI AND ZAMBIA (1998)) (maintaining that the contemporary rhetoric of “traditional culture” “still
impugns the rationality and inventiveness of traditional peoples, defined as those living in the developing
countries of the global South.”).
34
Suzanne Last Stone, Cultural Pluralism, Nationalism, and Universal Rights, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1211,
1217 (2000); see also Pahuja, supra note 33, at 459. One concern among African human rights scholars
has been the need for stronger protection of indigenous cultures on the international level. Because the
right of religious freedom can include the right to proselytize, the spread of Christianity and Islam has been
seen as an encroachment on traditional religious beliefs. See Makau wa Mutua, Limitations on Religious
Rights: Problematizing Religious Freedom in the African Context, 5 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 75 (1999).
35
Nyamu, supra note 27, at 383.
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socioeconomic inequalities that ultimately resulted in the exploitation of women.36
Accordingly, more basic concerns such as the right to food and shelter took precedence
over “issues . . . most easily identifiable as concerns to relatively privileged women in the
West . . . includ[ing] violations that threaten the freedom of movement, freedom of dress,
freedom of bodily integrity, and freedom of control over one’s sexuality.”37 This stance
contrasts with the classic feminist approach that focuses an allegedly disproportionate
amount of attention on forms of “alien and bizarre oppression of women of color,” such
as “sati, dowry death, veiling, female genital surgeries, female infanticide, marriage by
capture, purdah, polygamy, footbinding, and arranged marriages.”38 Although the
materialist view may draw attention to the larger structural conditions that result in
female oppression, it has been criticized for being dismissive of the various cultural
practices that have a specific and direct impact on women.39
A more recent, postmodern school of thought that developed in the 1980s focuses
on the structure of gender relations and how the roles assigned to men and women
perpetuates inequality.40 This view takes a “comprehensive approach to social relations
[that] considers other forms of social differentiation (such as race, class, ethnicity, and
age) to be as important as gender.”41 Consequently, proposed remedial measures are
designed to not just assist women, but also “change both gender roles and the system
through which they are defined, demand[ing] far-reaching reform in gender relations,
36

Id. at 386.
Volpp, supra note 31, at 1210. Celestine Nyamu notes that “[w]ithin Western-based international
women’s rights scholarship and practice . . . the issue of control of economic resources (including land) by
women has not gained prominence. This omission stems from a bias in the human rights practice that
emphasizes civil and political rights over economic, social, and cultural rights.” Nyamu, supra note 27, at
399.
38
Id. at 1208.
39
Nyamu, supra note 27, at 387.
40
Id. at 383, 387.
41
Id. at 387.
37
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especially at the family level.”42 The radical reforms envisioned by the postmodern
approach would be impracticable to achieve since they “require an overhaul of social,
economic, and political institutions.”43
The majority of human rights groups pursue an “abolitionist approach” that
echoes the feminist view’s call to eliminate cultural practices that contradict the
principles of international human rights law.44 The abolitionist approach thus seeks to
achieve its goals by enacting legislation that would serve to substitute local custom.
However, opponents of this brand of top-down reform have argued that the abolitionist
approach frequently does not adequately consider the cultural context that surrounds
controversial practices, thus failing to propose comprehensive solutions. Not
surprisingly, local observers have bristled at the imperialist undertones of abolitionism,
which advances proposals that are viewed as “decontextualized, hegemonic, and
counterproductive for gender equality in practice.”45
Indeed, the wholesale importation of Western political ideals and institutions can
produce unintended consequences when applied across a vastly different cultural
landscape.46 Furthermore, reforms that are aggressively imposed on a community from
the outside may be interpreted as an assault on that community’s identity, thus provoking
more rigid interpretations of community tradition to the detriment of subordinated

42

Id.
Id. at 388.
44
Id. at 392.
45
Id. at 394.
46
See Stone, supra note 34, at 1217. For example, Woodman counsels that “it has been frequently
observed an intervention by the state to change or suppress the oft-criticized practice of marriage payments
(“bride-price”, lobolo) may have far-reaching and unforeseen effects on the social structure of the people
involved.” Woodman, supra note 15, at 166.
43
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members.47 For example, the Indian Supreme Court’s 1985 ruling in Mohammed Ahmed
Khan v. Shah Bano Begum,48 which granted maintenance to a divorced woman beyond
what was required by Islamic law, mobilized Muslim communities into mounting a
successful campaign to have the legislature over the decision.49 India had already been
experiencing intense sectarian strife at the time and thus many Muslims perceived Shah
Bano as a “part of a pattern to assimilate [them] and others into the larger Hindu
culture.”50 Ironically, Muslim women living in multicultural India now have much more
limited legal recourse in disputes over maintenance, unlike their counterparts in majority
Muslim countries, such as Egypt.51
A preferable alternative to abolitionism incorporates both cross-cultural dialogue
and internal discourse in arriving at solutions that protect the rights of women.52 This
approach would recognize the value of international norms, but then tailor them to fit the
circumstances on the ground. Thus, a deep understanding of the indigenous milieu, that
is, “the meaning and dialing existential experience of culture,” is essential.53 Indeed,
lessons about the importance of the compatibility of foreign legal concepts to local
circumstances are already being unearthed in the areas of corporate governance and

47

See Jeff Spinner-Halev, Feminism, Multiculturalism, Oppression, and the State, 112 ETHICS 84, 96
(2001).
48
(1985) 1 S.C.S. 96.
49
Jain, supra note 5, at 215-17; Spinner-Halev, supra note 47, at 100.
50
Spinner-Halev, supra note 47, at 100.
51
Ayelet Shachar, Religion, State, and the Problem of Gender: New Modes of Citizenship and Governance
in Diverse Societies, 50 MCGILL L.J. 49, 68-69 (2005) [hereinafter Shachar, Religion, State, and the
Problem of Gender].
52
Nyamu, supra note 27, at 393-94.
53
For outside observers, this can be achieved through the concept of “world traveling,” a concept
developed from Critical Race Feminism, wherein “we see ourselves in historical context, see ourselves as
the ‘other’ might see us, and see the ‘other’ within her own complex cultural and legal context.” Wing,
supra note 32, at 813.
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antitrust law.54 Emerging literature on the so-called “transplant effect” illustrates how
legal systems that are transplanted from other countries, such as in the case of
colonialism, tend to be less effective as applied in receiving nations where there is a
“mismatch between preexisting conditions and transplanted law.”55 While similar
analyses have yet to be performed in other areas of law, it is reasonable to conclude that
any substantial program of legal reform should be carried out with the support of the
members of the community whose traditions will be affected.56
III. A BRIEF POLITICAL HISTORY OF TANZANIA
Missionary zeal in the nineteenth century first incited European interest in
Tanganyika,57 with Germany occupying the region from the late 1800s until the end of
World War I.58 Following the war, Germany passed control of Tanganyika to Britain
pursuant to a League of Nations mandate.59 During this time, the British chief
representative had the power to make ordinances with respect to local customs and laws
for the good government of the country.60 Britain then ruled Tanganyika as a United

54

See generally Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor & Jean-Francois Richard, The Transplant Effect, 51
AM. J. COMP. L. 163 (2003).
55
Id. at 168.
56
See Shachar, Religion, State, and the Problem of Gender, supra note 51, at 60; Spinner-Halev, supra note
47, at 107-08. For example, the campaign against female genital mutilation (“FGM”) among the Sebei
people of Uganda was initially met with resistance by community elders, who felt that the practice was an
integral part of Sebei identity. Those leaders eventually became less defensive about such “outside
interference” after women’s groups began framing the issue of FGM in terms of health and safety, rather
than human rights. Educational programs highlighting the dangers of FGM were ultimately successful,
leading to a marked decline in the practice by the Sebei. See Tripp, supra note 4, at 427-32.
57
History of Tanzania, http://www.tanzania.go.tz/historyf.html (last visited May 17, 2006)
58
Background Note: Tanzania, U.S. Dep’t of State, Mar. 2006, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2843.htm
[hereinafter History].
59
Id.; The German Empire ceded its colonies to Allied powers by virtue of Article 119 of the Versailles
Peace Treaty. Norrie, supra note 2, at 397. In 1918, the U.S. President Woodrow Wilson announced that
the German colonies “should be declared the property of the League of Nations.” Kenneth Ingham,
Tanganyika: The Mandate and Cameron 1919-1931, in HISTORY OF EAST AFRICA 544 (Vincent Harlow
ed., 1965).
60
Ingham, supra note 59.
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Nations trust territory after World War II.61 The mid-twentieth century saw the first
organized local elections and in December 1959, Britain granted self-government to
Tanganyika following general elections that were held in August 1960.62 In May l961,
Tanganyika achieved autonomy and wrote a new constitution.63 Full independence was
secured on December 9, 1961.64
Zanzibar began as an early Arab/Persian commercial center.65 The Portuguese
established a trading post in Zanzibar in the latter part of the sixteenth century66 and
dominated it throughout the seventeenth century.67 Omani Arabs retook Zanzibar in the
early eighteenth century and by 1840 Sultan Seyyid Said transferred his capital from
Muscat to Zanzibar.68 Zanzibar functioned as an independent Arab state until it became a
British protectorate in the late nineteenth century.69 In exchange for the right to maintain
the throne of Zanzibar, the sultan transferred all foreign relations matters to the British
officials.70 Britain continued to rule Zanzibar through the sultanate until after World War
II.71 During the mid-1940s, Britain began establishing local village and government
councils.72 Six years after the first local elections took place in 1957, Zanzibar received
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its independence from the United Kingdom, thus becoming a constitutional monarchy
under the sultan.73
In 1964, Zanzibar joined with Tanganyika three months after Zanzibari
nationalists overthrew the archipelago’s Arab sultan in a bloody revolution.74 The United
Republic of Tanzania was born on October 29,75 with Zanzibar maintaining significant
political autonomy.76 In the late 1970s, the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU),
which was the chief political party in the mainland, merged with the Afro-Shirazi Party
(ASP) of Zanzibar to form the CCM (Chama cha Mapinduzi-CCM Revolutionary
Party).77 This union was ratified pursuant to the Tanzanian constitution of 1977 and
reinforced under later versions of the charter in 1982 and 1984.78
IV. DEVELOPMENT OF TANZANIA’S LEGAL SYSTEMS
A. Tanganyika
The legal system in colonial East Africa created different systems of justice for
Europeans and indigenous persons.79 For natives of Tanganyika, Germany created a
judicial system that was closely tied to executive authority.80 Colonial district officers in
charge of military stations could delegate adjudication of disputes to local leaders who
also exercised executive functions.81 They were instructed to decide cases using local
law because the German administration considered the Africans “insufficiently advanced
73

Id.
Simon Robinson, A Whiff of Revolt On Spice Islands; Thirty-six years after its union with Tanzania,
Zanzibar considers divorce, TIME, Oct. 30, 2000.
75
History, supra note 58.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
Norrie, supra note 2, at 396.
80
Anthony Allott, Development of the East African Legal System During the Colonial Period, in HISTORY
OF EAST AFRICA 348 (D.A. Low ed., 1976).
81
Id. at 396-97.
74

15

to come under German law.”82 Although the native law courts were not subject to any
strict rule of law, they were to abide by general legal considerations and common sense.83
Following the German handover of its colonies to the Allied Parties, Britain
established the Tanganyika Order in Council as the basic law for the territory
encompassing Tanganyika.84 Britain further enacted the Courts Ordinance to “regulate
the administration of justice in the territory.”85 The Courts Ordinance maintained the
previous system of separate adjudication for foreigners and the indigenous population86
although appeals from the native courts could be sent to the colonial High Court.87
Similar to the German design, the local tribunals were to be governed by the laws of the
indigenous population as long as the laws were not “repugnant to justice and morality.”88
For the white population of Tanganyika, Britain established courts of common law,
including a district magistrate court, a resident magistrate court, and the High Court.89
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As with its other East African territories, Britain enacted a legal code based on the
statutes it enforced in India.90
According to Eugene Cotran, this dual system resulted in “an almost complete
isolation of the African courts and customary law in the colonial era . . . Furthermore,
there appears to have been a general lack of interest by the colonial governments in the
problems arising from the content and application of the customary law.”91 This apathy
meant that the British made no effort to study or record customary law,92 the principles of
which were treated as a matter of fact and not law.93 As a result, conflicts between
customary and statutory law remained unresolved.94 Furthermore, customary law was
not the province of the professional lawyer because advocates could not appear before the
African courts.95
Following independence in 1961, Tanganyika became a member of the British
Commonwealth and terminated the system of appeals to the Crown.96 Most notably,
Tanganyika instituted a complete separation between the executive and the judiciary and
eliminated the parallel, raced-based court system.97 During this time, the challenge for
Tanganyika and its East African neighbors was to unify their legal systems so that “no
one should find himself living at one and the same time under two kinds of law, English
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and African, and in the sense that persons of different communities or races should not
find themselves, by reason only of their origin, placed under different legal systems.”98
The Magistrates’ Courts Acts of 1963 and 1984 established a unitary three-tier
court system in Tanganyika.99 The first tier consists of subordinate courts, including
primary courts, district courts, and resident magistrates’ courts.100 The primary court is
the lowest court in the country, with jurisdiction extending to civil cases where the
applicable law is customary or Islamic law, as well as disputes involving minor civil
debts and matrimonial proceedings.101 The High Court102 follows in the hierarchy and
exercises jurisdiction over Tanganyika only.103 The Court of Appeal is the highest court
and is competent to hear appeals from both Tanganyikan and Zanzibari court
decisions.104
B. Zanzibar
The development of the Zanzibari legal system differed from that of Tanganyika.
Although a minority, Arabs created a strong Arab-Muslim influence on Zanzibar by
virtue of their economic dominance.105 During the British protectorate era, the courts
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were comprised of a British jurisdiction and a Zanzibari one.106 The former consisted of
a High Court and lower courts called British subordinate courts.107 As in other East
African territories, the civil and criminal codes of British India applied.108 A parallel
system existed for Zanzibar, consisting of the Sultan’s Court and the subordinate
courts.109 The subordinate courts consisted of first-, second-, and third-class subordinate
courts, kadhis’ courts, and juvenile courts.110 The kadhis’ courts “administered a limited
range of civil litigation in which the parties were Muslims.”111
Following Britain’s grant of self-government in 1963, Zanzibar drafted the
Constitution of the State of Zanzibar.112 The Courts Decree, which was enacted after the
fall of the sultan’s government in 1964, created the High Court113, district courts, kadhis’
courts, primary courts, and juvenile courts.114 The British courts were abolished after
independence.
The People’s Court Decree 1969 introduced a separate court structure for
Zanzibar, comprised of the people’s area courts, the people’s district courts, the kadhis’
courts, the High Court, and the Supreme Council.115 Legislation in 1984 and 1985116
106

Id. Indeed, the first British jurisdiction established in East Africa was in the Sultanate of Zanzibar.
Allott, supra note 80, at 350. “The most important legal fact about the East African territories was that
they abutted on the Indian Ocean. The system of codified law introduced into British India, the criminal
and civil courts and the procedure that they followed, were copied or applied in the British East African
possessions; and it was through Zanzibar that this Indian influence came to the mainland territories.” Id.
The 1884 Order in Council (Art. 8(a)) even directed British courts in Zanzibar to apply the Statute law as
applied by courts in Bombay. Id. at 351. Appeals from the British sphere on the East Coast of Africa
(except for Zanzibar) were to be sent to the Supreme Court at Bombay. Id. at 354.
107
Norrie, supra note 2, at 399.
108
See generally Allott, supra note 80, at 348-368.
109
Norrie, supra note 2, at 399.
110
Id.
111
Id.
112
Id. at 403.
113
Article 92 of the Constitution also established the High Court. Id. at 403 n.50.
114
Courts Decree, No. 22 of 1963; see also id. at 403.
115
Id. In the late 1970s, Zanzibar also drafted the Constitution of the Revolutionary Government of
Zanzibar 1979. Id.
116
See High Court Act 1985; Kadhis’ Court Act 1985; Magistrates’ Courts Act 1985.

19

ended the system of people’s courts and replaced it with common law-style
adjudication.117 This legislation ushered in three types of courts in Zanzibar: the High
Court of Zanzibar, the kadhis’ court, and the magistrates’ court.118
The High Court is the chief court in Zanzibar and enjoys unlimited jurisdiction
over both civil and criminal cases.119 Appeals from the High Court lie with the Court of
Appeal of Tanzania.120 Below the High Court are three types of magistrates’ courts.121
The primary magistrate court has limited civil and criminal powers,122 while the district
court has both original and appellate jurisdiction along with greater civil and criminal
powers.123 The resident magistrates exercises original and appellate jurisdiction and
hears all cases from the district magistrates’ courts.124
The Kadhis’ Courts Act of 1985 established kadhis’ courts for every district and a
Chief Kadhi’s Court for Zanzibar.125 The jurisdiction of the kadhis’ courts is restricted to
questions of Muslim law in regards to personal status, marriage, divorce, and inheritance,
as well as cases where all parties profess the Islamic faith.126 The rules of evidence
applicable in a kadhi court depart from the rules normally prescribed by Islamic law:
This departure is noticeable in two areas: in hearing evidence all witnesses
called shall be heard without discrimination on grounds of religion, sex or
otherwise; and each issue of fact shall be decided upon the assessment of
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credibility of all evidence before the court and not upon the number of
witnesses who have given evidence.127
The Chief Kadhi’s Court acts as an appellate court for all kadhis’ courts and has no
original jurisdiction.128 Appeals from the Chief Kadhi’s Court lie with the High Court,
wherein the judges, along with four sheikhs, decide cases according to a majority vote,129
which is final.130
C. United Republic of Tanzania
Although Tanzania is a nation with two distinct court systems, the Court of
Appeal and the Constitutional Court are two venues for judicial cooperation. The Court
of Appeal of Tanzania is the highest court in the Republic131 and can only hear appeals
from the High Court and subordinate courts with special jurisdiction.132 The special
Constitutional Court, which is provided for in both the Constitution of Zanzibar133 and
the Constitution of the Republic of Tanzania,134 is charged with hearing disputes arising
from interpretation of the Union Constitution “where such interpretation or its application
is in dispute between the Government of the United Republic and the Revolutionary
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Government of Zanzibar.”135 The Constitutional Court reportedly has never met, as “any
attempt to convene could be easily interpreted as an attempt to undermine the Union.”136
V. THE LAW OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE IN TANZANIA
A. Unification of Marriage Law in Tanganyika: The Law of Marriage Act
The movement for the unification of laws during the early postcolonial period in
East Africa was most pronounced in the area of family law, which had been particularly
beleaguered by the choice of law problems created by the plural legal system inherited
from the British.137 The fact that individuals “rarely confined their actions within one
system of law” encouraged much confusion and mischief.138 For example, Bart
Rwezaura has noted the phenomenon of Christian men who enter into monogamous
marriages and then use customary law to acquire additional wives, only to disavow
obligations towards a subsequent spouse by disputing the legal effect of the later
relationships.139 Additionally, courts dividing the property of persons who died intestate
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were often left with the unenviable task of deciding which rules to apply based on the
community to which that individual purportedly belonged.140
In order to untangle the competing bodies of family law, the African Conference
on Local Courts and Customary Law was held in Dar es Salaam in 1963.141 This
conference inspired the government of Kenya to create the Commission on the Law of
Marriage and Divorce in 1967, which issued a report the following year and urged reform
and integration of the disparate systems of religious, customary, and law via a proposed
Law of Matrimony Act.142 Ultimately, the Commission’s efforts stalled in Kenya, where
the draft bill was rejected by the legislature multiple times on the grounds that it was “unAfrican, a model of English law that took insufficient account of African customs and
traditions and gave too many rights to women.”143
Tanzania, however, adopted the Kenyan model in overhauling its own family law
system.144 Mapendekazo ya Serikali juu ya Sheria ya Ndoa (Government’s Proposals on
Uniform Law of Marriage), Government Paper No. 1 of 1969, incorporated most of the
reforms advanced by the Kenyan draft bill and provided the groundwork for Tanzania’s
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groundbreaking Law of Marriage Act, 1971 (“LMA” or “the Act”).145 Those reforms
included the recognition of religious and customary marriages, registration requirements,
the establishment of marriage conciliation boards, the requirement of a judicial decree as
a prerequisite to a valid divorce, and the presumption of marriage based on a two-year
period of cohabitation.146 Although these changes appeared to enjoy widespread support
among certain sectors of the political class,147 some have questioned whether the general
public had an adequate opportunity to debate the merits of the proposed LMA before it
came into effect.148 Nevertheless, the Tanzanian parliament’s proactive stance garnered
it credit for “tak[ing] the pioneering step of enacting the first measure in Commonwealth
Africa (or indeed in any of the Commonwealth states with comparable problems of plural
legal systems) to integrate the diverse personal laws of marriage and divorce which were
formerly applicable.”149
1. Key Statutory Provisions
a. General Scope and Definition of Marriage
Although the LMA represents a significant step in the integration of family law,
the unification of marriage and divorce laws under the LMA is far from absolute.
Spanning 167 sections, the statute supplanted the much-weaker Declaration of Customary
Law and covers a broad range of issues previously governed by the various legal regimes
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operating among Tanzania’s disparate communities.150 While the Judicature and
Application of Laws Ordinance and the Magistrates’ Courts Act provide for the
application of religious and customary law in certain civil matters, the LMA supercedes
the patchwork of marriage and divorce laws,151 “the precise inter-relationship between
which was ill-defined and gave rise to some difficult questions of conflict of laws.”152
Because family law is not considered a Union matter, however, the LMA applies only in
mainland Tanganyika and not in Zanzibar.153 Thus, only individuals in Tanganyika may
rely on reforms promulgated by the LMA.
The LMA also provides for only a partial integration of family law by applying
special accommodations for certain religious marriages.154 Under the statute, a marriage
is defined as “the voluntary union of a man and a woman, intended to last for their joint
lives”155 and may either be monogamous (or intended to be monogamous) or polygamous
(or potentially polygamous).156 On one hand, the LMA exhibits great regard for
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marriages performed under Islamic and customary law by allowing for polygamous
unions and even presuming that those relationships are potentially polygamous by
allowing a husband and wife to convert their monogamous marriage into a polygamous
one (and vice versa) by joint declaration.157 On the other hand, the statute also defers to
Christian sensibilities by declining to extend this privilege of convertibility to marriages
“celebrated in a church in Christian form . . . for so long as the parties continue to profess
the Christian faith.”158 While the LMA thus sanctions polygamy in many cases,
polyandry is strictly prohibited.159
One of the more controversial portions of the LMA is the provision establishing
common law marriage.160 If a couple has cohabited for a period of at least two years “in
such circumstances as to have acquired the reputation of being husband and wife,” a
rebuttable presumption of marriage arises.161 Where that presumption has been rebutted,
the woman may still apply for maintenance for both herself and her children if she can
show that the couple “did in fact live together as husband and wife for two years or
more.”162 In such scenarios, the court also has the power to award custody of the
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children, order maintenance payments or “grant such other reliefs . . . as it has
jurisdiction under [the] Act.”163
b. Prerequisites to Marriage
Despite the LMA’s deference to religious and customary tenets in establishing the
marriage relationship, the Act contains numerous provisions that are generally applicable
to all communities. The minimum age for marriage is eighteen years old for males and
fifteen for females.164 However, courts may in their discretion waive this requirement to
allow marriage between minors where either party has obtained the age of fourteen and
there exist “special circumstances which make the proposed marriage desirable.”165
Persons must enter into the union with freely given consent,166 or in the case of girls
below the age of eighteen, obtain consent from the bride’s father.167 Furthermore,
marriages with certain close relatives are strictly prohibited.168 However, the Act also
makes marriage more accessible by eliminating the payment of bride price as a
prerequisite,169 which is a common practice among many customary and religious
communities.170
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The LMA imposes a notice requirement, wherein parties to a marriage must
inform a registrar or registration officer of their intent to marry at least three weeks
before the proposed date of the ceremony.171 The official must then publicize news of the
impending nuptials, thus providing individuals an opportunity to come forward with any
objections to the relationship.172 With regard to polygamous unions, the LMA gives the
current wife (or wives) the right to object to additional spouses if the husband is of
limited means and the marriage would likely cause hardship to the family, or if the
would-be wife is “of notoriously bad character,” inflicted with a communicable disease
or is “likely to introduce grave discord into the household.”173 A court or marriage
conciliation board may hear an objection and in the presence of the parties involved,
make a fact-based determination as to whether the marriage should be allowed to
proceed.174
c. The Marriage Contract
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A marriage may be contracted either civilly or according to the rites of a
particular religion or customary community.175 The Act provides a definition of Muslim
marriage and Christian marriage. The former is “contracted in the manner recognized by
Islam or by any school or sect of that faith,”176 while the latter is “celebrated in a church
in the manner recognized by Christian faith or by any denomination or sect of that
faith.”177 An Islamic marriage may be celebrated according to Islamic rites by a kadhi or
a registration officer who is a Muslim.178 Either an Islamic cleric or a registration officer
who is a Muslim may apply to become a licensed kadhi.179 Two witnesses must be
present at the time of contracting,180 the celebration of which is open to public in cases of
civil marriage.181 For religious and customary marriages, members of that faith or
community are allowed to attend.182
d. Marriage Registry
One significant step towards the efficient administration of marriage laws in
Tanganyika is the establishment under Part III of the LMA of registries tracking
marriages, annulments, and divorces.183 The mainland is divided into registration
districts, with a registrar assigned to each district.184 The registrar is obligated to record
civil marriages, while religious officials have a duty to register the nuptials over which
175
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they preside.185 In the case of customary marriage, the parties themselves must file for
registration within thirty days after the ceremony.186 Upon granting an annulment or
divorce, a court must send a copy of the decree to the Registrar-General, which is
charged with keeping a database of such dissolved marriages.187
e. Property Rights
Married women are granted the same rights as men in acquiring, holding, and
disposing of property.188 Each spouse retains separate rights in their property absent an
agreement stipulating otherwise.189 Any property obtained in the name of one partner
during the course of the marriage creates a rebuttable presumption that the property
“belongs absolutely to that person, to the exclusion of his or her spouse.”190 However,
neither the husband nor the wife may unilaterally transfer rights in the matrimonial home
without the other person’s consent.191 Where such a prohibited transaction occurs, the
other spouse retains the right to reside in the house as long as the marriage remains
intact.192
f. Reconciliation, Divorce, and Division of Assets
The LMA enshrines traditional concepts of informal dispute resolution prevalent
in many African communities193 by establishing marriage conciliatory boards for each
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ward.194 Courts must refrain from hearing a petition for divorce unless the couple has
first referred the matter to one of these boards.195 The board hears testimony from both
parties, neither of which may be represented by legal counsel, and conducts mediation in
order to repair the couple’s damaged relationship.196 If the board fails to bring to parties
together, it will issue a certificate attesting to the failed reconciliation and may include it
own recommendations regarding the dispute.197
When a court hears a petition for divorce, it looks to see if the marriage has
deteriorated to an irreparable state in deciding whether to dissolve the union.198 A
determination of marital breakdown will examine the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the parties’ relationship, with due regard given to the custom of the
community to which the couple belongs.199 Evidence showing that a marriage has
collapsed may include: adultery,200 “sexual perversion,”201 cruelty,202 neglect,203
desertion,204 voluntary or judicial separation lasting for a period of at least three years,205
imprisonment206 or mental illness.207 Another relevant factor is if the respondent spouse
changes faith and the laws of the religion formerly shared by both parties renders the
194
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union dissolved.208 A special provision also applies to Muslim marriages,209 wherein
courts will automatically accept as valid a divorce obtained according to Islamic law,
provided that the board certifies that it was unable to foster reconciliation.210
Once a marriage is dissolved, the court has the power to divide assets jointly
acquired by the couple during the course of the marriage.211 Two main factors the court
considers in making this determination are the customary norms of the community to
which the parties belong and the “contributions made by either party in money, property,
or work towards the acquiring of the assets.”212 This latter provision has proven to be
contentious, as it does not specify what kinds of activities constitute work done in
contribution to the accumulation of marital assets.213
g. Maintenance and Child Custody
Another novel development introduced into the Tanzanian legal system by the
LMA is the availability of maintenance for women.214 Situations where a court may
order a husband to make payments to his wife include: neglect, desertion, separation,
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divorce or during the course of any matrimonial proceedings.215 The determination is to
take custom into account, as well as the degree of responsibility apportioned to each party
for the breakdown of the marriage.216 Remarriage by either party extinguishes the right
to maintenance.217
The guiding tenet in the awarding of child custody is the best interest of the
child.218 Whenever consistent with this principle, the court also takes into consideration
the wishes of the parents, the child’s desires, and the customs of the community to which
the parents belong.219 However, the LMA creates a rebuttable presumption that “it is for
the good” of a child under the age of seven to reside with his or her mother.220 Courts are
not bound to award custody of all children to one parent.221 In the absence of an
agreement between the parties, the father has a duty to maintain his children regardless of
whether he has physical custody of them.222 If the father is dead, missing or otherwise
unable to provide maintenance, the support obligation transfers to the mother.223
2. Interpreting the Law of Marriage Act
Several decades have elapsed since the enactment of the LMA, thus paving the
way for a substantial body of law interpreting the Act’s many provisions. While some
cases have resolved ambiguities in the LMA and expanded certain legal rights, other
decisions have exposed major gaps in the statute. The Court of Appeal’s celebrated
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decision in Bi Hawa Mohamed v. Ally Seifu224 resolved a long-running split among lower
courts as to whether women could claim housework and child care as contributions to
jointly-acquired marital assets.225 In the 1971 case of Rukia Diwani Kinzi v. Abdalah Issa
Kihenya, the High Court broadly read Section 114 of the LMA to include such efforts.226
A more conservative approach, which was adopted in the High Court’s 1980 decision of
Zawadi Abdallah v. Ibrahim Iddi, posited that a wife’s domestic services did not factor
into economic contributions because the LMA’s drafters did not positively state
otherwise.227 The Bi Hawa court declined to uphold the reasoning in Zawadi, which had
relied on the original report issued by Kenya’s Commission on the Law of Marriage and
Divorce. Instead, the tribunal applied the mischief rule, which construes statutes based
on the inequity that the legislation was designed to eliminate.228 Accordingly, the Court
of Appeal held that the LMA was “an instrument of liberation and equality between the
sexes” that sought to “cure or rectify was what may be described as the traditional
exploitation and oppression of married women by their husbands.”229 Therefore, Section
114 was read to include domestic services in determining the contribution of each party
to familial wealth.230
The judiciary has taken generous approaches in other situations involving postdivorce remedies as well.

In the 1991 case of Joseph Sindo v. Pasaka Mkondola, the
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available to married couples upon dissolution of the relationship.231 By granting the
female petitioner an equitable share of the couple’s jointly-acquired assets, the High
Court gave extra teeth to the LMA’s presumption of marriage provisions.232 The later
opinion of Halima Rashidi v. Amon Peter represented a significant advancement in the
welfare of nonmarital children.233 In that 1993 decision, the High Court ruled that the
best interests of the child standard should be applied in deciding custody even though the
LMA’s provisions technically did not cover the children of unmarried parents.234
Courts have also asserted the supremacy of the LMA in several cases where the
Act’s provisions potentially conflict with the rules of customary law or religious
authority. In the 1990 case of Doitha Thuway v. Amathi Bura, the High Court found that
cattle qualified as marital assets available for distribution to former wives, despite the fact
that in some customary communities, land and livestock can only be passed on to direct
descendents.235 A more recent High Court decision, Jonathan v. Republic, held that
despite an accused rapist’s assertion that his actions constituted a traditional marriage
under customary norms, there cannot be a valid union without the woman’s consent.236
The High Court also refused to enforce a Muslim conciliation board’s award of 500,000
shillings as a parting gift to a woman divorced under Islamic law in Njobeka v.
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Mkogoro.237 According to the tribunal, the board’s authority ended once reconciliation
had failed; therefore, its recommendations were not binding and the primary court erred
by not dividing the marital assets according to party contribution.238
One area in which case law has been unfavorable to women involves the property
rights of co-wives in polygamous marriages. In Maryam Mbaraka Saleh v. Abood Saleh
Abood, a senior co-wife was unsuccessful in reopening divorce proceedings involving her
husband and a former co-wife.239 The ex-wife had won her case before the Court of
Appeal, which held that she was entitled to forty percent of the marital property based on
her contribution.240 The fact that the husband was engaged in a polygamous marriage
was never brought up until the remaining co-wife sought to secure her share of the
assets.241 Unfortunately, the Court of Appeal declined her request for relief on the
grounds that she was not a party to the original divorce proceedings.242 However, even if
the co-wife had been aware of this pitfall, she still would not have had much recourse,
since remaining co-wives cannot be parties to divorce petitions.243 Thus, the court’s
ruling effectively gives divorcing co-wives a superior interest in matrimonial property.
This gap in the LMA’s provisions is surprising, as the Act “appears to contemplate only
the divorce of couple who are monogamously married.”244
3. Reforming the Law of Marriage Act
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While the LMA espouses “a policy inspired by caution, sensitivity and
flexibility,”245 the Act has attracted its share of criticism following its enactment. Just as
organizations, such as the women’s arm of the ruling party, Umoja wa Wanawake
Tanzania (UWT), were instrumental in passing the LMA,246 these same groups have been
dedicated to improving the Act by receiving complaints about various provisions that
have been attacked as being ineffective or unfair.247 In 1986, the Law Reform
Commission (“Commission”) began reviewing the LMA, employing a variety of data
collection methods, including hearings in local communities and the distribution of
questionnaires to both experts and laypeople.248 The fruits of the Commission’s efforts,
the Report of the Law Reform Commission on Law of Marriage Act (No. 5, 1971), were
finally presented eight years later to the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs.249
One key area that the Commission targeted for reform is the treatment of marital
property. After citing the successful implementation of separate property systems in
other Commonwealth countries, the Commission identifies several problems created by
the current Act, mainly the use of customary law in determining the division of property
and the statute’s failure to explicitly recognize housework and childcare as contributions
to the acquisition of family assets.250 Regarding the former, the Commission notes that
under some customary laws, women are categorically denied any share of property, while
in other communities, the families of women blamed for causing marital breakdown must
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repay the dowry.251 Because Tanzania’s constitution provides for equal protection and
prohibits “any law that is discriminatory either of itself or in its effect,” the Commission
recommends that references to customary law be struck from the LMA’s provisions on
marital property. Not only would this amendment bring the Act in line with
constitutional principles but also fulfill Tanzania’s obligations under the Convention of
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (“Discrimination
Convention”) and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child.252
Additionally, in light of the Bi Hawa decision, the Commission recommended that the
LMA should be “amended to include wifely-duties of a house-wife as contribution
enough to entitle her to a share of the family assets when the marriage breaks down.”253
Another problem which the Commission addresses but offers no solution to is the
difficulty of determining each party’s ownership of individual property or contributions
to particular pieces of property acquired jointly.254 The fact that most people do not
possess written records of such transactions creates an impediment to the equitable
division of assets.255 This is especially true for many households that are located in rural
areas256 or where the woman is an unemployed housewife.257 Thus, even though Bi
Hawa broadened the scope of contribution to family assets, “courts still are reluctant to
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divide matrimonial properties equally and instead continue to give preferential treatment
to the income-generating spouse who is usually the husband.”258 The inability of a wife
to provide courts with tangible records, such as receipts, is a major issue.259
In the arena of child custody, the Commission criticized the practice of courts
“tend[ing] to take as a mandatory rule” the rebuttable presumption that children under
seven years old are better off living with their mothers.260 Such awarding of custody
sidesteps a best interest of the child analysis, which is what the LMA mandates.261 On
the other hand, the Commission also noted cases wherein the father of a child who is
automatically placed with the mother “lays in waiting” and petitions for custody the
moment the child turns seven.262 Rather than condoning the failure of courts to “have
regard to the undesirability of disturbing the life of an infant by changes in custody,” the
Commission instead strongly encourages parents to enter into voluntary custody
agreements as an alternative to court-imposed settlements.263 The goal behind this
recommendation is to foster an amicable compromise between parents, thus sparing
children from bitter familial disputes that impede the advancement of their best
interests.264 However, the Commission makes one recommendation that may conflict
with the principles mentioned above. Despite admonishing judges for glossing over the
“best interest” test promulgated by the LMA in child custody cases, the report
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nevertheless proposes that in the absence of good cause, mothers should be awarded
custody of children below fourteen years of age.265
The Commission has also identified several problems in the process of awarding
maintenance. First of all, in the absence of any agreement stipulating otherwise, the
LMA imposes on fathers the duty to maintain their children “whether they are in his
custody or the custody of any other person, either by providing them with such
accommodation, clothing, food and education as may be reasonable having regard to his
means and station in life or by paying the cost thereof.”266 No such obligation applies to
mothers, who are responsible for maintenance only where the father is dead, missing or
unable to provide the requisite support.267 The Commission criticized this disparity and
proposed that the LMA be amended so that “[t]he maintenance of a child must be a
shared affair, where both parents are able and/or of means to pay.”268 According to the
Commission, the current maintenance obligations fail to adequately consider the mother’s
ability to pay.269 While such recommendations appear to advance the egalitarian spirit of
the LMA, it is doubtful that their enactment would significantly impact the allocation of
maintenance where the majority of women are of limited economic means.
In addition, the Commission found that the process of executing and enforcing
court orders for maintenance was burdensome and inefficient.270 Courts may order
maintenance payments to be made directly to the custodian (in most cases, the mother) or
to the court.271 When the latter option is exercised, the receiving parent usually
265
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experiences long delays in obtaining payment.272 Although the court has the power to
attach salaries in order to secure maintenance, employers do not act promptly in
deducting sums from paychecks and delivering those funds to the court.273 Some
employers even halt payments after receiving protests from the employee.274 As a result,
the Commission issued a call for a “streamlining of the court’s administrative section” so
that maintenance could be paid more rapidly.275
The Act’s prerequisites to marriage are also ripe for reform according to the
Commission. For example, the twenty-one-day notice period was found to be too brief,
especially in communities where the means of publicizing nuptials are rudimentary.276
Furthermore, parties have exploited the easy availability of special “emergency” licenses
as a way to sidestep the notice requirement.277 In addition, registration requirements have
been characterized as unnecessarily burdensome, especially in the context of customary
law marriages.278 Again, this is an area where despite the LMA’s policy of unifying the
laws of marriage, not all unions are treated the same way.279 While kadhis and other
ministers have the duty to register the marriages they solemnize, marriages contracted
under customary law are oftentimes performed in remote locales that are not readily
accessible to registration authorities.280 Because the obligation to register a marriage is
placed on the parties if an officer is unable to attend the ceremony, “these marriages more
272
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often than not become [a] secret affair, as far as the state authorities are concerned.”281
Consequently, the report suggests that customary law marriages be recorded as soon as
they are performed and that each village have a designated secretary empowered to
register marriages on the spot like a kadhi.282
Not surprisingly, the Commission set its sights on the LMA’s minimum age
requirements, which stand out as among the most visibly discriminatory provisions of the
LMA.283 Although it pointed out that the draft bill of the LMA as proposed by
Government Paper No. 1 of 1969 was in line with international norms at the time it was
released,284 the intervening years have brought many social and political changes that
necessitate elimination of the provision creating different ages of consent based on
gender.285 One main factor was the fact that the law considered fifteen-year-old girls
capable of entering into a marriage covenant, which “has far reaching obligations than
normal commercial contracts.”286 Indeed, the age of capacity for all other legally-binding
agreements is eighteen, as is the voting age.287 This inconsistency impacts girls who
“may easily be coerced into a marriage by greedy parents and cause a lot of miseries to
the girl in her married life.”288 Furthermore, because a girl can marry at a young age,
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those girls so affected are denied are the chance to complete higher education or acquire a
trade.289 The Commission also cited “ample medical evidence” that “it is unhealthy and
dangerous for a girl below the age of 20 years to give birth to children.”290 Ultimately,
the Commission recommended not only to apply the same age limit to both males and
females, but also proposed that it be raised to twenty-one years.291 While this suggestion
would laudably eliminate a major source of inequality in the Act, it curiously would also
preserve the disparity in ages of majority for triggering various legal and political rights.
Despite receiving complaints regarding the marriage reconciliation boards, the
Commission expressed its commitment to the LMA’s dispute resolution regime, albeit
with some changes.292 In an effort to ensure that female perspectives are incorporated
into the procedure, the Commission proposed that the Act guarantee women
representation on marriage conciliation boards.293 Furthermore, the report stressed that
the purpose of these bodies is to repair marriages and therefore board members should
refrain from assigning blame to any of parties.294 In the interest of processing disputes in
a timely manner and minimizing hardship to the parties, the Commission called for cases
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to be resolved within a period of six months295 and encouraged proceedings to be held in
camera “as much as practicable.”296
While the bulk of the proposals advanced by the Commission involve the
amendment of the LMA’s existing provisions, the report’s recommendation to delete the
presumption of marriage stands out as the one instance where the Commission has
advocated for the repeal of a reform originally ushered in by the Act.297 The
Commission’s vehement opposition to common law marriage is quite evident in the
report’s determination that “the presumption of marriage diminishes the sanctity of [the]
marriage institution and [is] a mockery of those who marry according to established rites,
religious or otherwise.”298 Indeed, the report’s otherwise dispassionate stance regarding
religious issues became quite heated as the drafters wondered, “If the state wishes to
protect [the] interest of children born out of [cohabitation] why it should not enact a law
to facilitate such protection without referring [to] the sinful relationship between men and
women as a marriage?”299
In a response to the report’s avowed hostility towards the LMA’s presumption of
marriage, Professor Rwezaura, who served as a consultant to the Commission,300 issued a
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law. Rahmatian, supra note 141, at 304.
296
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Id. at 4.0.
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Id. at 3.4.1.
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defense of Section 160,301 noting the government recognition that the prevalence of de
facto unions was already a social reality in Tanzania during the drafting the LMA.302
Furthermore, customary laws tend to treat marriage as “a process which is capable of
completion over time,” thus making it hard to determine an exact point at which such
couples can be considered married.303 In other cases, men have acquired wives under
customary law without notifying the woman that they are still married to another woman
under civil or Christian rites.304 Thus, “Parties remain ignorant of their actual legal status
under state law for a very long time – until one day a marital dispute or the death of one
of the parties (especially the husband) throws a dark shadow on the validity of their
marriage.”305
In addition to providing some legal certainty to customary law relationships,
Section 160 is a key component in advancing the LMA’s goal of granting parties greater
autonomy in contracting marriage and to mitigate the vulnerable position of nonmarital
children. As to the first issue, the presumption of marriage allows couples to overcome
the most significant socioeconomic hurdles to attaining an official marriage.306
Regarding the second concern, the informal nature of cohabitation makes important legal
remedies difficult to obtain in the absence of certain recognized obligations on the part of
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parents.307 For example, “the lack of documentary evidence often provides an incentive
to the parties to dispute the existence of marriage.”308 As a result, women and children in
particular would be put at an even greater disadvantage without Section 160, since it is
“one of the few available means for [them] to access maintenance.”309
Despite Section 160’s concerted effort to preserve accountability in de facto
unions, one significant gap remains. Because the provisions only recognize
presumptively valid (i.e., voidable) marriages, no statutory remedy exists for children
born into void unions.310 The most prevalent example of this situation occurs when a
women unwittingly cohabits with a man who is still legally married to another.311 Thus
while a court is empowered to issue declaratory judgments examining the validity of a
marriage, it does not have the jurisdiction to award maintenance or divide assets should
that marriage be found invalid.312 This state of affairs, coupled with the fact that no
mechanism is in place of “legitimizing” children, represents a violation of Article 2 of the
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, which prohibits against
discrimination based on birth status.313 Nevertheless, Rwezaura makes a convincing
argument that the baseline measures offered by the LMA should at the very least be
maintained because “[f]or male cohabitants who wish to discard their partners, section
160 presents a nuisance to their notion of male hegemony and economic exploitations of
females labour.”314
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Despite the Law Reform Commission’s wide-ranging proposals for improving
the LMA (notwithstanding its stance on de facto unions), the report fails to address other
problem areas in the Act. For example, although the LMA provides that the absolute
youngest age at which a couple may marry is fourteen (where either party is below the
general minimum age and parental consent has been obtained), Section 138(6) of the
Penal Code “states that ‘any person of African or Asiatic descent’ may ‘marry or permit
the marriage of a girl under the age of twelve years old in accordance with the custom of
the tribe or religion, so long as it is not intended that the marriage be consummated
before the girl is 12 years old.’”315 In addition, marital rape is not a legally-recognized
concept in Tanzania.316 As a result, child brides forced into sexual relations with their
husbands may have no recourse under the law.317
Other commentators have identified ways in which the marriage dissolution
process and awarding of post-marital remedies under the LMA can be reformed. The
requirement that parties establish in court certain facts as evidence of marital breakdown
has been characterized as superfluous because divorce proceedings are initiated only after
a marriage conciliation board has already recognized the irreparable state of the union.318
Additionally, as previously mentioned, the LMA disadvantages co-wives who remain in a
polygamous marriage by apparently granting a divorcing wife a superior interest in the
315
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division of marital assets.319 Furthermore, it has been suggested that women should be
automatically entitled to marital property and not have such protection be subject to the
court’s discretion.320
For all its flaws, the reforms ushered in by the LMA represent an important step
in protecting the rights of women and children in Tanganyika and have elevated Tanzania
as a model for other African nations.321 However, while the Act is certainly expansive in
its scope, its provisions have been described as only a partial integration of family law in
Tanganyika.322 This characterization is mostly attributed to the preservation of religious
and customary law precepts for many aspects of marriage and divorce.323 For example,
Muslims receive special treatment in that courts will automatically validate a divorce
performed under Islamic law.324 Likewise, the Christian ideal of marriage is inscribed
into the LMA by denying Christians the ability to contract into polygamous unions, an
option which is available to other parties under the law.325 Indeed, the principle that
“[t]he law should interfere with religious and customary practices as little as possible”
has “prevented an entire unification of the marriage laws.”326
B. The Law of Marriage and Divorce in Zanzibar
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The majority of one million Zanzibaris are Muslim327 and the remaining religions
are Christianity, Hinduism and Zorathastrian.328 While Zanzibar does not have a purely
Islamic legal system in existence, in accordance with Islamic law329 kadhis’ courts have
exclusive jurisdiction over Muslim cases concerning personal status, marriage, divorce,
and inheritance.330 Due to the inherent nature of four schools and the absence of a
uniform code, multiple interpretations of Islamic law have developed throughout the
years resulting in a disparity between governance of Zanzibari Muslims.331 Furthermore,
Zanzibar’s separate family law system for Zanzibari Muslims delineates different rights
in marriage and divorce from Zanzibari non-Muslims, Tanganyikan Muslims and
Tanganyikan non-Muslims.332
1. The Law of Marriage and Divorce for Muslims in Zanzibar
a. The Marriage Contract
The legal structure for Muslim marriage and divorce is established in the
Qur’an.333 Muslim marriage regularizes sexual relations between men and women and
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some extended definitions include expectations of children.334 Illustrating the role that
Islam has in regulating the marital bond, the Prophet Muhammad proclaimed,
“[m]arriage is my tradition,”335 and that “[h]e who rejects my traditions is not my
follower.”336 Marriage thus bestows social prestige and religious merit for Muslims.337
Permanent marriage, nikah, is considered to be a contract of exchange with the ijab, or
offer, made by the woman or her guardian and the acceptance, qabul, made by the man,
along with the payment of a dowry (also known as bride price), or mahr, to the bride.338
The essence of the contract is a mutual understanding of these elements and full
consenting capacity of the individuals.339 The contract is considered valid only with the
presence of witnesses.340 In addition, a religious ceremony typically accompanies the
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DAVID PEARL & WERNER MENSKI, MUSLIM FAMILY LAW 139 (1998). The Muslim marriage is slightly
different than a Christian marriage in that it is not a sacrament. However, the marriage contract is a
contract before God and thus has some religious obligations. Id. at 139-40. Any sexual contact outside
marriage is prohibited and constitutes fornication, which is subject to heavy punishment. In addition,
celibacy is condemned. ZIBA MIR-HOSSEINI, MARRIAGE ON TRIAL: A STUDY OF ISLAMIC FAMILY LAW 31
(1993).
335
HAERI, supra note 333, at 33.
336
Id.
337
Id.
338
MIR-HOSSEINI, supra note 334, at 32. Muslim jurists make the distinction that a marriage contract is not
the sale of the bride to the husband. He does not have a right over her. However, he does have the right to
access her sexually and her reproductive abilities. Id. at 32-3; HAERI, supra note 333, at 33. As a structural
element, bride price cannot be eliminated from a marriage contract. Id. at 34. According to some
advocates, marriage contract terms can be specified by either party under Islamic law. For example, if the
bride’s parents insist that she finish schooling, they can include that provision in the contract. See
Interview with Shifaa Said Hassan, Coordinator, Media Council of Tanz., in Stone Town, Zanzibar, Tanz.
(Mar. 9, 2006); HAERI, supra note 333, at 38. The woman is expected in marriage to provide goods called,
vyombo which are usually purchased by her parents with part of the dowry. These goods include things
such as a bed, wash basins, and cooking pots, remain with the wife through marriage and divorce. Stiles, A
Kadhi and His Court, supra note 1, at 271 n.3. In Zanzibar, bride price is also referred to as mahari. Id. at
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exchange.341 In most Muslim societies, these rituals are elaborate and constitute
important rites of passage for the couple.342
Islamic law places limitations on Muslim women’s ability to enter into interfaith
marriages and polyandrous relationships.343 In contrast, under Islamic law, it is not
objectionable for men to marry women of other faiths344 or to practice polygamy with up
to four wives.345 Polygamy is permitted under certain circumstances along with the
consent of the first wife.346 It can be practiced with the purpose of caring for orphans
when a woman is widowed with children.347 Moreover, the husband should treat his
wives equally with respect to support and maintenance.348 As a result of these
restrictions, polygamy is usually either practiced in extreme situations or by wealthy
Muslim men.349
Under the Marriage and Divorce Muslim Registration Act (Muslim Act), the
parties to the marriage, the guardian of the woman, and two witnesses present at the
ceremony appear before the kadhi within fourteen days of the celebration, provide
pertinent information to the kadhi and sign the register.350 If the kadhi is satisfied that the
marriage has been celebrated under Islamic law and the parties have correctly represented
themselves, then he will register the marriage.351 In practice, anyone who passes an
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Islamic family law exam and receives a book of marriage certificates, can solemize a
marriage.352
b. Divorce
For Zanzibari Muslims, there is a three-step process for resolving marital
disputes.353 First, the couple must consult the family elders, the wazee.354 If the problem
persists and the marriage cannot be mended, the matter is taken to the sheha.355 If the
sheha fails, or if the problem is a complicated legal matter, the couple takes the sheha’s
referral letter to the state kadhi.356 The ultimate goal for some kadhis is to reconcile the
couple, while for others, they see their sole function as applying religious law, assuming
that the couple had already tried to repair the marriage with the efforts of the family
elders and sheha.357 Clerks of the kadhi’s court prepare the madai, the plaintiff’s claim
with the plaintiff’s approval.358 The court then issues a summons for the defendant and
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the defendant is given a chance to respond to the allegations.359 The parties are scheduled
to appear together before the kadhi and they are presented with the opportunity to provide
testimony and cross-examine each other.360 Witnesses may also be called to testify if
there are discrepancies over essential facts of the case.361 Even though the Kadhi’s Act
requires that all witnesses, regardless of sex, be heard equally,362 one kadhi noted that a
woman’s testimony is considered worth only half that of a man.363 The parties can be
called together to the court multiple times if necessary, but the parties appear before the
kadhi in a final meeting when he delivers his judgment.364
Under the Marriage and Divorce (Muslim) Registration Act, if the kadhi is
satisfied that the divorce is accurate under Islamic law and that the parties are who they
claim to be, the kadhi will register the divorce, creating a rijista.365 A divorce is not final
until it is officially registered with a kadhi’s court and the kadhi issues a divorce
certificate, or passi.366 The passi is an important document, as women are prohibited
from remarrying unless the certificate has been presented to the marriage official.367
Depending on the situation, the kadhi can deny the divorce and mandate that the parties
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remain married and work out their problems.368 If the litigants are not satisfied with the
judgment, they can appeal within a month to the Chief Kadhi in Zanzibar Town.369
Because of the contractual nature of marriage under Islam, Islamic law
specifically provides procedures for dissolving marital relations.370 Dissolution can occur
under the following situations: 1) death of a partner; 2) repudiation of the wife by the
husband, or talaq; 3) mutual consent, either through khul or mubarat; 4) annulment, also
known as faskh; or 5) separation by court decree, or tatliq.371
The male spouse has the unilateral right to divorce.372 The husband can initiate a
revocable, regular (talaq al-sunna) divorce or an irrevocable, irregular (talaq al-bid’a)
divorce.373 A revocable divorce is a quasi-divorce where the contract of marriage is not
completely dissolved.374 The husband and the wife remain separated for three months of
purity and if the husband repudiated his wife three times during the this time, he
completed the talaq.375 This form of divorce is considered a valid divorce.376 However,
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if the husband returns to his wife during the three-month period and resumes his marital
duties, then the talaq has not been fulfilled.377 The Prophet Muhammad limited this
practice whereby a husband can divorce and return to his wife only twice.378 With a third
revocable divorce, the husband is prohibited from returning to his wife.379
The husband can initiate an irrevocable divorce by oral pronouncement, written
divorce or by action-driven divorce.380 When the husband pronounces orally that he
divorces his wife three times, referred to as a triple divorce, the divorce takes legal
effect.381 A pronouncement is typically worded in this manner, “I, Hussan Mohammad,
am speaking in full mind, and you, Fatema Salah, are no longer my wife.”382 This form
of divorce requires the oral pronouncement be witnessed by two men under Islamic
law.383 In other accounts, women are divorced without their knowledge and a third party,
usually her parents, informs her.384 In such a case, formal proof is not available and the
woman relies on oral testimony.385 When the pronouncement is made orally, many wives
insist their husbands write down the talaq to establish credible evidence in the kadhi’s
court.386 In Zanzibar, the action-driven talaq is also practiced.387 A divorce driven by
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action is when a husband prohibits his wife from performing an action and if she
performs the action, she is divorced.388
Under Islamic law, the wife may not have a unilateral right to divorce, but she has
the capacity to initiate divorce proceedings.389 She may obtain her freedom by paying an
amount of money equal to, more or less, her brideprice.390 This option, known as khul, is
not a unilateral right of women because it requires mutual consent of the husband.391
Even though khul results in divorce, it is not equal to the unilateral right of talaq.392 In
Zanzibar, khul divorces can be ordered by the court when a woman is found to be at fault
for a failing marriage, which is usually indicative of her desire for a divorce, or if the
wife refuses reconciliation.393 Additionally, if the husband and wife agree to mutually
release one another, also referred to as mubarat, then their marriage can be dissolved.394
Lastly, a marriage can be dissolved by court decree, tatliq, or by annulment,
faskh.395 Tatliq requires the intervention of the kadhi’s court to declare the divorce on
behalf of the wife or to compel the husband to pronounce a divorce.396 In Zanzibar, the
wife typically goes to kadhis court with a complaint for maintenance during the marriage
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and the court essentially summons the husband.397 If he fails to appear, then the divorce
is usually granted to the wife.398 If the husband appears, then the kadhi court can act as a
mediator or it can grant the divorce, depending on the situation.399
From January 1, 1999 to July 15, 2000, the Mkokotoni court received 70 marital
disputes, with 35% involving a disputed divorce.400 Shaykh Haji, the kadhi in
Mkokotoni, looks beyond the husband’s repudiation of his wife to certify the validity of a
talaq divorce.401 He scrutinizes the circumstances surrounding the divorce, to ascertain if
the proper intention motivated the action.402 Shafi’i legal texts such as Bughyat alMustarshidin suggest that intention plays a significant role.403 Shaykh Haji specifically
looks at the meaning of the husband’s words and actions.404 He listens to both the
plaintiff’s and the defendant’s claims and deciphers the intentions behind the
pronouncement, whether it be oral, written or by action.405 He is in tune with the nuances
of the situation.406 After reviewing the testimony, the kadhi will decide if the divorce is
proven.407
Most Zanzibari men utilize the written divorce pronouncement outside of court to
initiate divorce.408 An example of a written divorce pronouncement, which was held
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invalid, was submitted to the court by Abdulmalik, a thirty-year old male.409 His wife,
Mariam, age nineteen was educated in religious matters and would often teach him after
returning from the mosque.410 Mariam instructed Abdulmalik on how to divorce by
advising him to write, “Mariam, you are no longer my wife” three times.411 Thereafter,
Mariam claimed that they were divorced.412 Shaykh Haji ruled the divorce a nullity
because Abdulmalik testified that he thought he was receiving religious education and
had no intention of divorcing Mariam.413
Oral divorce pronouncements are also used by Zanzibari men, as long as the
pronouncements are spoken in the presence of witnesses.414 One attempt at oral divorce
was related earlier in the case of Shindano, the sixty year-old woman who was ordered to
return to her husband.415 Under societal norms, her husband’s rejection constituted
divorce, however, under Islamic law the divorce was not fulfilled.416
While it remains an option, the action-driven divorce is rarely utilized.417 For
example, Shaykh Haji heard a case where Leila, age thirty-two, sued for divorce from her
husband, Bakari, age forty.418 In their marriage contract, Bakari was obligated to
maintain Leila and it also required him to pay her 50,000 shillings (approximately $65
USD) in back maintenance by a certain date.419 Because he was not able to uphold these
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elements of the marriage contract, Leila claimed that she was divorced.420 Shaykh Haji
found that the divorce was not in effect because Bakari had made a good faith effort to
pay the back maintenance and more importantly, he had no intention of divorcing
Leila.421
c. Property Rights
Under Islamic law, women have equal rights with men in acquisition and disposal
of property.422 This is evidenced from a woman’s absolute property right to her mahr, or
dowry, as she can give it away as she wishes. 423 The Muslim religion assigns a duty to
the husband to provide material means for the family.424 As the wife is not required to
contribute to the family’s maintenance, any of the wife’s property or any income she may
earn, however, is considered her own.425 Under Islamic law, joint marital property is
nonexistent and therefore in divorce, a woman is limited to administering her own
property.426 In Zanzibar, as a general rule, husbands and wives tend to keep their
financial affairs separate.427 Where a house was acquired by the effort of both spouses,
however, the High Court of Zanzibar has held that the property should be recognized as
marital property and in the even of a divorce, should be divided between the spouses.428
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d. Maintenance and Child Custody
Under Islamic law when the husband unilaterally divorces her, a Muslim wife has
a right to maintenance during the eda period, which is three months.429 Interestingly, a
husband can backdate a pronouncement by saying, “I divorce you since December 2001”
to avoid paying the amount due throughout eda.430 After the three months, the husband is
no longer obligated to maintain his ex-wife.431 In the strictest of sharia provisions, the
wife is not entitled to anything beyond the dowry and if the marriage was consummated,
she is entitled to maintenance during the eda period.432 However, all Muslim schools
tend to agree that a consideration of socio-economic conditions, customs and traditions
may influence the extent of maintenance.433
Under Islamic law, there is a distinction between physical custody and
guardianship. Custody entails care and control of the child, whereas, guardianship deals
with the legal rights and obligations of the child’s father and representatives.434 Fathers
generally have both custody and guardianship of their children.435 If a child is under the
age of seven years, however, the child is placed in the physical custody of the mother.436
After age seven, the child returns to the father.437 Typically, Zanzibari women are afraid
to return children to their remarried ex-husbands.438 Mothers are leery of stepmothers
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because stepmothers rarely provide the same level of care that a mother provides.439
Divorced mothers may relinquish custody of children to their in-laws, if the in-laws show
interest.440 This option is uncommon due to the extra expense imposed on the
grandparents.441 Nonetheless, it is the duty of the father to provide financial maintenance
of his children until they are eighteen years old.442
2. The Law of Marriage and Divorce for Non-Muslims in Zanzibar
a. The Marriage Contract
Customary law, which is an amalgamation of approximately 120 types of tribal
law, British Common law, and Indian law governs marriage among non-Muslims in
Zanzibar.443 As previously discussed, the LMA was solely enacted in Tanganyika and its
reach does not extend to Zanzibar.444 Although the majority of Zanzibaris are Muslims
and thus subject to the tenets of Islamic law, the Marriage Solemnisation and Registration
Act (“Marriage Act”) also exists to govern civil marriage for individuals who do not
subscribe to Islam.445 Under the Marriage Act, non-Muslims may marry, but are required
to register with authorities.446 The statute requires one party to give notice in written
form three months prior to or until the Registrar has granted the marriage.447 The notice
is kept in a “Marriage Notice Book” and it is also posted in the Registrar’s office.448
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A number of prerequisites must be satisfied before the Registrar may issue a
marriage certificate:449 one of the parties must be a resident within the district in where
the marriage is intended to take place at least fifteen days preceding the granting of the
marriage; each of the parties to the intended marriage (not being a widower or widow)
must be twenty-one years old, or if either of them is under that required age, parental
consent must be provided in writing;450 close relatives or persons with lawful hindrances
are prohibited from marriage; and parties who are currently married by native law or
custom are prohibited from marrying.451
Once the Registrar is satisfied that the requirements to the marriage have been
fulfilled and the fee is paid,452 the Registrar issues the marriage certificate.453 Marriages
may be solemnized or celebrated in any licensed place of worship and must be signed by
the minister and two witnesses.454 In the alternative, a marriage can be solemnized before
the Registrar.455 Marriage for non-Muslims must be solemnized officially through the
Registrar as the presumption of marriage or common law marriage is not recognized in
Zanzibar.456
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b. Divorce
Sparse information is available regarding the divorce procedures for non-Muslims in
Zanzibar because the Marriage Act was codified in 1915 without a provision for
divorce.457 In a document prepared by the Government of Zanzibar and UNICEF in
2001, it states that, “Non Muslims cannot be divorced through the civil courts.”458
Under the Civil Procedure Code, one piece of legislation recognizes the right of action
between a husband and wife for the “restitution of conjugal rights.”459 In injured spouse
can seek a financial remedy if either spouse fails to comply with the order for
restitution.460
c. Property Rights
Women have equal rights to marital property.461 All property that is acquired during
the course of the marriage is considered joint property.462 Both women and men hold
individual rights to property owned prior to the marriage.463 As previously mentioned, the
High Court of Zanzibar held in a divorce case that when both spouses made an effort to
acquire property, the property was considered matrimonial property and was divided
between the spouses.464 Unfortunately, few women are aware of this right.465
d. Maintenance and Child Custody
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The magistrate also decides other issues, such as, division of marital property,
maintenance of the wife, custody of the children, and maintenance of the children.466
Even though little information is available as to the length of maintenance of the wife,
child custody is determined by the court based on the habits of the mother.467 Court fees
are not expensive, however, due to judicial corruption, a party has the ability to
financially influence a judge.468 This injustice reduces the court’s accessibility to women
of lesser economic means.469 In addition, many Zanzibari women are typically unaware
of their rights under Civil law.470 As a result of these problems, many non-Muslims
divorce informally.471
3. Special Provisions for Unwed Mothers and Nonmarital Children
Reflecting the religious sentiment prevalent in Zanzibar, a special law directed
against unwed mothers was enforced for until recently.472 Based on strong Islamic
principles limiting sexual relations to within the marriage context, the Spinster Divorced
Protection Act No. 4 (“Spinster Act”) of 1985 provided that if an unwed woman became
pregnant, she was subject to imprisonment for two years.473 The mother was also
restricted from returning to school after fulfilling her sentence.474 The father of the child
could also be imprisoned for two years. Due to mounting criticism that the law punished
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illegitimate children by forcing them to be born in prison, the statute was repealed in
2005 and replaced with the Spinsters and Single Parent Children Protection Act of
2005.475 Unwed mothers are no longer imprisoned, but are still required to perform
community service starting three months after the child’s delivery.476 The mother serves
the community for a total of six months and she is entitled to be reinstated in school the
next academic year.477 If the father of the child is under the age of eighteen, he can also
be required to perform community service.478 Furthermore, males that are proven or
alleged to be the father of a nonmarital child have the duty to provide maintenance for
that child.479
VI. RESPONDING TO LEGAL PLURALISM
As the previous section has outlined, Tanzania’s system of multicultural
accommodation results in vastly different sets of rights that are available to individuals in
marriage and divorce based on geography, religion, and customary community affiliation.
In almost all cases, women are the ones who are disadvantaged by the inequalities
enshrined in the various legal orders accommodated by the state. While it is clear that
existing laws should be amended to protect the legal rights of women, the complex
dynamics inherent in a pluralist, postcolonial society such as Tanzania call for a sensitive
approach to reform that is attenuated to the interests of all parties involved.
For those wishing to advance the rights of women in the face of discriminatory
cultural practices, a few considerations must be taken into account. For example, a
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heavy-handed imposition of majority values upon a community may drive that
community to adopt stricter interpretations of its cultural traditions in response to
perceived assaults from the outside world.480 Indeed, “when people’s identity is attacked
or demeaned, they often react by clinging to it ever more fiercely.”481 For scholars such
as Shachar, this so-called “reactive culturalism”482 represents a kind of “political crisis”
483

wherein well-intentioned attempts to protect women can actually place those

vulnerable individuals in a worse position socially and legally.484
Furthermore, outside observers, especially those espousing secular feminist
perspectives, oftentimes dismiss religious traditions as merely a source of oppression and
ignore the role of those beliefs as a source of cultural meaning and social cohesion in the
lives of many women.485 Indeed, religion can be such an integral part to self-identity that
“women who belong to religious groups that suffer discrimination or that feel besieged
because of their minority position would be unwilling to undermine their communities by
making public collective feminist demands in concert with women not members of their
own community.”486 Referring to Jewish and Muslim women as an example, Rhoda
Howard-Hassman suggests that “women [in those communities] might very well decide
that they would rather not wash their dirty linen in public.”487 In other words, an
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uncompromising antagonism towards religion can be counterproductive, as its forces
women to choose between individual rights and spiritual or social belonging.488
For these reasons, in addition to those mentioned earlier,489 a purely abolitionist
approach would be an inappropriate response to legal pluralism in light of the complex
dynamics inherent in a multicultural, postcolonial populace. Reformation of
discriminatory cultural practices should thus stem from genuine internal transformation,
lest overt coercion by outside forces be met with resistance from the community itself.
While the process of social change is a difficult project fraught with many challenges,
“[i]f incentive structures change, cultural identities, practices, patterns, and meanings can
be quite fluid, flexible, and open to transformation or reinvention.”490 Despite the
portrayal of traditional cultures as monolithic and unchanging, experience has shown that
the constituent beliefs and practices are open to negotiation where circumstances
necessitate or encourage it.491 Islamic family law, for instance, has been subject to
multiple interpretations around the world, which has resulted in varying conceptions of
rights and duties across different Islamic nations and societies. While Islamic law as
applied to Muslim communities in Tanzania and India permits polygamy, the practice has
been outlawed or severely limited in states like Tunisia and Morocco, where the
overwhelming majority of the population are Muslims.492
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A. The “Transformative Accommodation” Model of Joint Governance
In deciding how much autonomy to allocate to accommodated communities,
policymakers need to pursue mediated measures that balance the group rights and
individual liberties.493 Gordon Woodman’s concept of “selective legal pluralism”
represents one such compromise, which involves “purposeful intrusion by the state into
customary law fields, ground in principle with reference to each set of particular
circumstances.”494 Likewise, Brenda Oppermann maintains that “[s]ince traditional law
is an integral and valuable element of many legally pluralistic societies, it need not be
wholly renounced because of its discriminatory aspects.”495 However, where customary
and religious law conflicts with recognized international human rights standards or
ignores the legal protections guaranteed by national constitutions, those discriminatory
provisions should be overridden.496 As Shachar points out, “[i]f the contemporary
multicultural state hopes to provide relief to citizens whose rights are violated by their
groups’ traditions, then theorists and legislators must recognize that the state should not
fully relinquish its power over identity groups.”497
If one begins with this premise that state intervention into group autonomy is
warranted in certain situations, Shachar’s paradigm of joint governance is an illuminating
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example of how to negotiate the complexities of legal pluralism.498 In the context of
family law, religious and cultural communities, or nomoi groups,499 would have the
ability to police their own boundaries since it is a function that is essential to group
identity.500 Such jurisdiction would include “among other things, who can become a
group member through marriage, and under which conditions divorced group members
can marry within the faith and have children who will be considered full and legitimate
members of the community.”501 On the other hand, the state would have the power over
issues like alimony, property division, and child support because those “are not concerns
unique to group members” since “[a]ll state citizens potentially face similar dispute when
dissolving marriage.”502 Thus, the state can and should apply uniform laws to deal with
issues that do not directly implicate the integrity of a particular nomoi group.503
Thus, Shachar’s conception of joint governance, or “transformative
accommodation,” embodies three main elements.504 First, contested social arenas, such
as family law, are to be divided into “sub-matters,” with jurisdiction allocated along submatter lines.505 The second element, which is closely related to the first, posits a “no
monopoly” rule that ensures that neither the state nor the individual nomoi group wields
exclusive authority over a particular social arena.506 Third, individual members of a
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nomoi group must be given clearly delineated choice options in deciding whether to
invoke the jurisdiction of the state over the nomoi group should the nomoi group fail to
adequately protect the interests of the individual.507 While jurisdiction primarily lies with
the nomoi group, this final element of transformative accommodation allows members to
opt-out of group authority in the face of oppressive treatment.508 The state should thus
act as the ultimate guarantor of equality by relying on the individual rights granted by
national constitutions and statutes, as well as applicable international conventions.509
Shachar concludes that the existence of state jurisdiction as a competitive choice option
creates an incentive for group leaders to respond to the needs of vulnerable constituents
or else risk losing dissatisfied members.510
B. Joint Governance, Legal Pluralism, and the Tanzanian Experience
To a great extent, a system of joint governance in family law has already been
established for most Tanzanians. This has been achieved in the form of the Law of
Marriage Act in Tanganyika. While jurisdiction over matters of personal status remains
with the various religious and customary communities within Tanzania, the state has
applied uniform provisions over matters such as consent, brideprice, registration, custody,
and maintenance. The Act has thus been a welcome development for judges as well as
litigants faced with the task of navigating Tanzania’s pluralist legal system. Furthermore,
nonmarital children have received increased protection through the presumption of
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marriage established by Section 160 of the LMA. Consequently, the LMA represents a
significant step in securing the equality of women under the law.
Nevertheless, as the Law Reform Commission and other observers have pointed
out, there are areas of marriage and divorce law where Tanganyikans receive
discriminatory treatment either directly under the provisions of the LMA itself or through
the undue discretion given to customary and religious communities by the Act to regulate
certain issues. A primary example is the continued application of customary law to
issues of marital property, which can result in women being denied an equitable share of
marital assets upon dissolution of marriage. Furthermore, the LMA does not officially
recognize domestic work as a contribution to marital assets even though the Bi Hawa
decision has set a precedent for courts to decide otherwise in the division of marital
property. Additionally, the LMA sets the marriage age at eighteen for males, yet girls
may be married off as young as fifteen. Even this already limited protection for girls is
further reduced by the Penal Code’s loophole that permits the marriage of girls under
twelve if pursuant to religious or tribal custom. This law sidesteps the uniform age
provisions of the LMA and offers no remedy for child-brides who are forced into sexual
relations with their husbands.
In Zanzibar, where there is no uniform law of marriage, the religious and
customary traditions have a near monopoly over important issues of family law, unlike in
Tanganyika. The kinds of reforms that have generally benefited Tanganyikans of all
religions via the LMA are unavailable to Muslims in Zanzibar. Because Muslims make
up the vast majority of Zanzibaris, there are no opportunities for individuals born into
Muslim communities to opt out of Islamic law in favor of state jurisdiction over areas
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such as divorce, division of marital property, child custody, and maintenance. For the
small fraction of Zanzibaris who are not Muslim,511 there are not even any official
statutes to regulate divorce, maintenance, and child custody. In a positive move,
however, Zanzibar’s lawmakers have tempered the harsh provisions of the old Spinster
Act by replacing it with the Spinster and Single Parent Children Protection Act, which
while still punitive in nature, spares nonmarital children the burden of being born in
prison. Furthermore, the law also provides maintenance to children conceived outside of
marriage.
Certain applications of Islamic law also create disadvantages for women. For
example, Muslim women do not have the same unilateral right to pronounce a divorce as
a Muslim man and can only seek a divorce with the consent of her husband or the kadhi’s
court. Moreover, Muslim women are required to respect eda and wait three months after
a divorce before they can remarry. Muslim men, on the other hand, do not have such a
restriction. Also, even though women have to right to own property under Islamic law,
they do not have to right to joint property in marriage.512 Again, while the LMA has
taken limited steps to regulate distributive aspects of marriage and divorce law, these
measures are inapplicable to women living in Zanzibar.
Another area ripe for debate is the continued sanction of polygamy by the state in
Tanzania. Current laws and the traditions they accommodate provide only men with the
right to possess multiple spouses. Neither the secular law of the LMA nor the religious
laws applicable to communities in both Tanganyika and Zanzibar permit polyandry.
While this discrepancy may simply reflect the cultural logic of Tanzanian society, the
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discriminatory treatment of women under the law is quite apparent. Women in
Tanganyika, however, do have a greater degree of autonomy because the LMA grants
them the ability to veto their husband’s marriage to a new wife. Unfortunately, the LMA
also fails to take in account the property interests of co-wives at divorce, as illustrated by
the Saleh decision.
Of course, such concerns over the denial of the right to polyandry and the
property rights of co-wives are relatively minor in the face of arguments calling for the
prohibition of polygamy altogether.513 Again, while attempts by the state to abolish
cultural practices must take into account the potential for reactive culturalism, it should
be noted that reform can indeed be effected if properly framed within local traditions.
For example, proponents of the ban on polygamy in Tunisia based their arguments on
passages from the Qur’an, which appears to acknowledge the inequalities inherent in
polygamous relationships.514 Similarly, recent changes to the family law in Morocco
carefully invoked religious authority to ensure the credibility of the proposed reforms.515
Indeed, a reflection of changing attitudes towards polygamy in the African context can
already be found in the Draft Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’
Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (Draft Women’s Protocol), which calls for an
end to the practice.516
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Tanzania’s unique political arrangement thus results in multiple layers of legal
pluralism that provide for different rights and duties based on gender, religion, custom,
and geography. A Muslim woman may not only receive different legal treatment than
her Christian neighbor, but may also assert more freedoms than a fellow Muslim living in
another part of the country. While this result is not necessarily objectionable under a
multiculturalist theory of justice, more recent understandings of multicultural
accommodation recognize the need to provide vulnerable individuals the option of
invoking state jurisdiction where the nomoi group fails to protect individual rights.
In Tanzania, the state’s authority to secure equitable treatment of citizens already
has a basis in several sources of domestic and international law. Article 29(1) of the
Constitution of Tanzania provides that “[e]very person in the United Republic has the
right to equal protection under the laws of the United Republic.”517 Section 4 further
states, “[i]t is hereby prohibited for any law to confer any right, status, or special position
upon any citizen of the United Republic on the basis of lineage, tradition or descent.”518
More specifically, the Constitution charges the state authority and all its agencies to
provide equal opportunities to all citizens without regard to their religion.519 In regard to
gender, Article 9(1)(g) states, “the Government and all its instruments of the people offer
equal opportunities for all citizens, men and women, regardless of color, tribe, religion or
creed.”520 Nevertheless, because this provision was included under the section,
“Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy,” the scope of the
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guarantee might be limited.521 Furthermore, “equal opportunities” may also be narrow in
its scope and can only be properly defined through adjudication.522
Beyond its own constitutional guarantees of equality, Tanzania has also
undertaken commitments to protect the rights of its citizens on the world stage. On a
regional level, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (“the Charter”)
provides for a number of civil and political rights traditionally referred to as “first
generation rights.”523 The Charter provides that every person is equal under the law and
is entitled to equal protection under the law.524 Article 2 further maintains that every
individual shall enjoy such rights without distinction of any kind.525 As a signatory to the
Charter, and having ratified it in 1984,526 Tanzania is bound to provide equal protection
under its laws regardless of a citizen’s gender or religion.
Tanzania’s membership in the United Nations also reflects its a commitment to
provide equality before the law to its citizens. Although it is not a binding legal
instrument in Tanzania, the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights
provides nations with a framework with which to address the rights of individuals.527
521

Freeman, supra note 322, at 126.
Id.
523
Yemi Akinseye-George, New Trends in African Human Rights Law: Prospects of an African Court of
Human Rights, 10 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 159, 161 (2001).
524
Organization of African Unity: Banjul Charter on African Human and Peoples’ Rights, 1982, 1 I.L.M.
58. Although sometimes described as a “meaningless document,” the African Charter on Human and
Peoples' Rights is the first attempt by African leaders to “establish a regional machinery for the
implementation of the rights of Africans.” Akinseye-George, supra note 523 at 162.
525
Id. Article 2 provides, “Every individual shall be entitled to the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms
recognized and guaranteed in the present Charter without distinction of any kind such as race, ethnic group,
color, sex, language, religion, political or any other opinion, national and social origin, fortune, birth or
other status.”
526
List of Countries Which Have Signed, Ratified/Acceded to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’
Rights, available at http://www.africa
union.org/root/au/Documents/Treaties/List/African%20Charter%20on
%20Human%20and%20Peoples%20Rights.pdf.
527
Article 7, Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The Declaration is based on the “inherent dignity” of
all people and affirms the equal rights of all men and women. The Declaration gives, “human rights
precedence over the power of the state.” Although states are permitted to regulate rights, they are
522

75

Furthermore, the LMA purports to eliminate discrimination against women in accordance
with not only the Tanzanian constitution, but also the United Nations Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (“CEDAW”).528 CEDAW,
which is the single most important international legal instrument of women’s rights,
established a comprehensive women’s equality statement that had binding legal effects
amongst countries that ratified the Convention.529
The spate of domestic and international legal instruments currently in force in
Tanzania provides a broad justification for the state its jurisdiction with regard to
individuals trapped in the paradox of multicultural vulnerability, either through
legislative action or court intervention. Indeed, the Tanzanian judiciary has already
demonstrated a willingness to invoke such authority. In the 1990 case of Ephraim v.
Pastory and Anor,530 the High Court overruled a customary rule that barred women, but
not men, from selling inherited clan land.531 In its reasoning, the Court relied on Article
13(4) of the Constitution, which states that “no person shall be treated in a discriminatory
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manner by any person acting by virtue of any law or in the discharge of a function of any
state office or the party, and its organs.” 532 Although the Constitution does not explicitly
refer to gender in its definition of “discriminatory,” the Court nevertheless interpreted
Tanzania’s ratification of various international human rights instruments, including
CEDAW, as supporting the rights of women.533
Consequently, the Ephraim case demonstrates that such multilateral commitments
can positively impact Tanzanian women by providing with viable alternatives to nomoi
group jurisdiction. As Marsha Freeman observes, “[m]aking the claim possible is an
investment in the future.”534
C. Challenges and Opportunities for Reform in Tanzania
While Shachar’s model of transformative accommodation presents an insightful
approach for jurists and policy-makers faced with the complexities of a pluralist society
such as that of Tanzania, a program of joint governance that embodies its ideals may be
limited by other practical considerations. Eric J. Mitnick, for example, points out that the
competitive effect produced by the choice of jurisdictions made available to the
individual under transformative accommodation also depends “not only [on] clearly
delineated choice options but also the capacity to exercise such options.”535 In particular,
individuals who might benefit from opting out of nomoi group jurisdiction may be
constrained from doing so due to the strength of the individual’s attachment to the
community.536 As such, “individuals socialized within a particular nomos to be
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compliant – individuals socialized into vulnerability, that is – may have a particularly
difficult time suddenly exercising agency.”537
Even where a woman’s desire to opt-out might be more pronounced, overt
community pressure or lack of resources may prevent the woman from exercising her
choice options. While the partial exit provided by transformative accommodation merely
serves as a fallback measure and thus should be less intrusive to community affairs, such
a challenge to nomoi group authority still generates a “rights vs. community” dilemma to
a certain extent. This is especially true for women with limited access to education or
money,538 as “[t]he less financially independent women are, the more they depend on
remaining in their community’s good graces” and “that without the ability to support
themselves independently women feel that they have no choice but to accept the
‘harmful’ cultural practices that their family and community encourage.”539 Thus, in
order for women to truly benefit from transformative accommodation across the board,
Mitnick counsels that “a model premised on individual agency in a multicultural context
must, at a minimum, provide for the sort of social, educational, and financial resources atrisk group members require to recognize, and take advantage of, jurisdictional
options.”540
Indeed, examining the legal capacity of women in Tanzania is an essential step in
measuring the equality afforded them under the law.541 In a general sense, legal capacity
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refers to the ability to acknowledge and to exercise the rights and corresponding
responsibilities of an adult within their society.542 Tanzanian women suffer from myriad
problems in trying fulfilling their legal capacity, such as a lack of knowledge of their
substantive and procedural rights, as well as difficulties in framing and expressing their
claims.543 On the other hand, it is argued that in Zanzibar in particular, Muslim women
are quite knowledgeable about their rights and tend to be aware of the social norms that
define a divorce.544 Furthermore, they also have equal access to mediation through
wazee, shehas or the kadhi’s court.545 Nevertheless, awareness of legal rights is diffuse
throughout Tanzania, where urban women, particularly those of greater economic means
are more likely to utilize the machinery of the official courts than their rural
counterparts.546 Therefore, programs to educate women on a local level are still crucial
for ensuring equal access to the state justice system at all levels.
The kind of measures to which Mitnick refers bring to mind broader structural
concerns that are truly global in nature, thus highlighting the importance of the work of
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non-governmental organizations (“NGOs”) on the ground in enabling women to know
and assert their rights in Tanzania.547 For example, the United Nations Committee on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women has reported on the efforts
made by NGOs and the government to raise the awareness of women’s rights through
outlets such as the Legal Aid Committee of the University of Dar es Salaam and the
Tanzania Media Women’s Association (TAMWA), as well as various educational
campaigns utilizing easy-to-read booklets, radio programs, and newspaper columns.548
Because Tanzania’s commitments to protect individual rights have both
international and domestic components, campaigns to strengthen the position of women
in Tanzania “means creating support for the effort, through local organizations and
international networks, to share both the burdens and the benefits.”549 In engaging with
religious tradition, Cheryl Preston observes that the success of this collaborative dynamic
depends on the subtle shaping of everyday transactions:
Outsider feminists need ultimately to defer to those with the greatest stake
in a religious institution for answers. At the same time, outsiders can,
through questioning, help tease out whether something is going on entirely
different from theology. And sometimes it helps feminists on the inside to
get support from women on the outside, especially when those women
carry some clout.
While dividing theology from culture may not be realistic on the large
scale, it can work in individual cases and with incremental steps. Women
can start in their own families and with how they teach their children:
“Families and communities can bring out social change by altering their
daily practices.”
Many times the most significant changes are
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generational. We can leave our daughters a better religious community
than the one we inherited.550
Indeed, the burdens are many, and overcoming them requires perseverance by those
working to transform the attitudes and practices of local communities from within.
While Tanzania has been fortunate in eluding the kinds of communal strife that
have plagued its neighbors, resistance to change is palpable in many sectors. In 1998, the
former chairperson of the UWT publicly questioned the practice of polygamy in
Tanzania, which caused her to be branded an apostate by some Muslim leaders.551 The
ensuing protests in Zanzibar, which in resulted in several casualties, prompted President
Mwinyi to assure the Muslim community that “the Government ha[d] no mandate to
enforce amendments of the holy scriptures like the Qur’an.”552 The fact even this kind of
internal debate can spark such a backlash highlights how calls for social change must be
presented with good faith and credibility to the communities in question.
Nevertheless, increased awareness by women of their legal rights on paper may
not translate into successful vindication of those rights in court. That is to say, the next
step involves “[a]n evaluation of judicial systems entails examination of how that system
deals with the rights of citizens and whether these rights are respected and guaranteed.”553
Such an inquiry reveals how strongly the rule of law operates in that society.554 The final
question then is whether an effective state judicial system exists in Tanzania that can
adequately protect the individual rights of those that wish to invoke its authority.
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Rainer Bierwagen and Chris Peter examined Tanzania’s court system by looking
at the independence of the judiciary, the effectiveness of legal reform, and unification of
the judiciary.555 In regards to the first matter, Bierwagen and Peter found that the
executive branch in both Tanganyika and Zanzibar exert considerable influence and
pressure on what are considered sensitive cases.556 Tanzanian judges, as high as former
Chief Justices, have been blindly subservient to the political parties that appointed
them.557 The executive has even jailed members of the judiciary for rulings that run
contrary to the current political agenda.558 Thus, the ruling party appears to hold the
judiciary in low esteem. Moreover, beyond political influence, attorneys and public
officials admit that the judiciary is susceptible to bribes from the representing parties.559
With such a corrupt and politically influenced judiciary, a Tanzanian citizen’s ability to
exercise his or her constitutional rights is seriously limited.
With regard to legal reform, the Republic of Tanzania has a tendency to ignore, or
take less seriously, legal issues.560 Also, “there is a tendency to underrate the intelligence
of the population by assuming that particular issues will not be called to question.”561
The Constitutional Court is one case in point. The fact that it has never convened in all
the years of its existence reveals indicates its establishment as an empty political
gesture.562 In fact, it is argued that a former president of Zanzibar was forced to resign
for attempting to convene the Constitutional Court.563 Therefore, there is a significant
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unwillingness within the executive branch to remedy the unconstitutionality of certain
laws.
Bierwagen and Peter’s findings, which were published in 1989, expressed
optimism that the dualistic court system of Tanzania was headed on path towards
unification.564 Experienced jurists from the mainland had already been traveling to
Zanzibar in order to strengthen that region’s legal system.565 Bierwagen and Peter thus
viewed the cementing of the two systems as a solution to increasing respect for the rule of
law and heightening protection of individual rights.566 In the context of family law, the
consolidation of state legal systems thus would arguably aid in the protection of
individual rights by providing a unified alternative forum to the authority of
accommodated nomoi groups.
VII. CONCLUSION
For the host of young countries dotting the African continent, colonialism is not
mere textbook fodder, but rather a profound historical phenomenon whose memory
remains fresh, especially for those generations old enough to experience it firsthand. In
the legal realm, the distinctions created by colonial administrators gave rise to a
fragmented system of justice based on various ethnic, religious, and tribal categories. For
newly independent colonies like Tanzania, this pluralist paradigm persisted in some areas
of law, this time supported by notions of multicultural accommodation instead of
colonialist desires to maintain racial separatism. Because of its role as the gatekeeper of
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group identity, family law is a major field where community autonomy has been allowed
to flourish.
As programs of multicultural accommodation have been established across a wide
variety of jurisdictions, critics have now turned to unique problems faced by individuals
subordinated within accommodated communities, particularly women. While most
countries have adopted constitutional guarantees of equal protection and signed
international conventions calling for an end to gender-based discrimination, these
commitments may be severely undermined by the state’s decision to let religious and
customary traditions control issues like property rights and maintenance. The fact that
women are disproportionately affected by poverty in many developing countries only
underscores the necessity of eliminating discriminatory barriers to their increased
participation in the economic life of the nation.
This recent literature on multiculturalism’s impact on women has thus attempted
to reconcile the tension between individual and group rights by advancing a system based
on political compromise and competitive jurisdiction. Under the model of transformative
accommodation, the state stands as the guarantor of equal protection by responding to
women’s claims for economic and social justice where these demands have been denied
at the community level. Officially granting women this option, of course, is only one
step – measures that promote awareness of options and a realistic ability to exercise them
are essential if true legal empowerment is to flourish.
The government on the mainland of Tanzania took a bold step decades ago in
enacting a uniform law of marriage. While the Law of Marriage Act of 1971 was an
incomplete integration of preexisting laws of marriage and divorce, it provided certain
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entrance points for state authority to ensure greater individual rights for women.
Nevertheless, flaws in the statute have been exposed over the years, and lawmakers
would greatly advance the egalitarian aims of the original Act by finally enacting many
of the changes proposed by the Law Reform Commission and other observers. Likewise,
marriage law in Zanzibar is ripe for reassessment, as the kinds of reforms that have
reduced gender-based discrimination in Tanganyika have yet to take hold in the islands.
A narrow investigation into marriage law ultimately arrives at the broader issues
of access to justice and the rule of law as it operates in Tanzania. These structural
problems go beyond the confines of any one area of academic inquiry and require the
continued sharing of expertise on an international scope to support social and political
transformations at the local level. Especially in nations where government resources are
limited, the task of promoting economic and political empowerment of women and other
minorities lies with private institutions and non-profit organizations. The scope of
services that these agents provide was all too evident from the authors’ own field study in
Tanzania. It is thus the authors’ hope that this article and the information it imparts serve
as one point of reference the continuing global dialogue.
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